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1 
Introduction 
 
The U.S. silver program is a dramatic illustration of how a course of action, undertaken by one 
country for domestic reasons and relatively unimportant to that country, can yet have far-
reaching consequences for countries if it affects a monetary medium of those countries. China 
was most affected. 
—Friedman and Schwarz (1963)1 
 
1.1. History Background 
If France’s stabilization (1926) marked the beginning of reestablishment process of the gold 
standard, Britain’s deprecation of sterling (1931) represented the prelude of going off the gold 
standard, which followed by Japan, the United States and other major economic entities. When 
the rest of the world sank deeper in the mire of gold shortage and the Great Depression, China, a 
country still adhered to the silver standard, maintained a relative independent connection to the 
global economy. In the initial stage of the Great Depression, most of countries experienced 
competitive currency depreciation, deterioration in international trade, wide fluctuations in 
exchange market and large-scale economic down turns, but Chinese economy developed. 
Thanks to the benefit from the silver standard, Chinese economy spared from the recession 
from 1929 to 1931. Adhering to silver standard means silver not only functioned as common 
commodity like what occurred in other countries under the gold standard, but also acted as 
metallic money and reserves in prewar China. Relatively low silver price against gold brought 
down the exchange rate of Chinese currency. Devalued domestic currency offset the combined 
influence of appreciated foreign currencies and deflationary foreign price index, which resulted 
in real depreciation in China. During this time period, Chinese trade situation and economy 
condition were developing compared to other countries suffering from the wide-scale depression.  
1 Milton Friedman, and Anna J. Schwartz, Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 ( Princeton: Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1963), 515. 
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In 1931, when Britain suspended gold convertibility and among the first  depreciated sterling 
of own accord, growth prospective of Chinese economy stopped due to increasing exchange rate 
caused by  foreign currencies competitive depreciation. The next year, when Franklin D. 
Roosevelt successfully defeated Hoover and became the President in the United States, “Do 
something for silver” turned into an essential component of the New Deal as a reward for the 
election support from the silver bloc in the congress. “Do something for silver”-the slogan 
induced a series of federal acts issued for increasing silver price. From the “Thomas Amendment” 
of May 1933 to the agreement assigned among the World Monetary and Economic Conference 
in London in June 1933, and the climax U.S. silver purchase act in June 1934, all these bills 
targeted at one common goal- keeping the world silver price to 1.29$ per ounce, which tripled 
the current price level. Although they were merely U.S. domestic policies concerning a common 
commodity, their impacts profoundly influenced the economy growth of China. Surging silver 
prices drained silver out of China in an unpredictable rate. In 1932, the silver net exports 
amounted to Ch$ 10 million. In 1933 the figure reached up to Ch$ 14 million. While in 1934 the 
figure boomed at Ch$ 256 million, which was almost 20 times compared to the level in previous 
year. Merely in August, two months after the United States announced the silver purchase act, 
net silver exports from Shanghai peaked at Ch$ 80 million. Large-scale silver flight seriously 
decreased Chinese silver reserves and impaired China’s fragile banking and monetary system. 
Contemporary records and historical accounts illustrated large reduction in output, widespread 
unemployment and economic contraction.  
In face with severe economic situation, Chinese central government conducted a series of 
policies such as exposing export tax on silver, charging equalization fees or issuing silver exports 
licenses to confine silver exports. However, the governmental capital control could barely 
fundamentally hold back the profit-orienting nature of silver capital when overvalued nominal 
Chinese silver price created space for speculation. The only option for the Nanking Government 
was to depart from the silver standard and nationalize the silver reserves. In November 1935, the 
Chinese central government announced to conduct monetary reform that suspended silver 
convertibility, adhered to fiat standard and centralized money issuing right to three government-
controlled commercial banks. Since then, the silver standard which had prevailed in China for 
over 600 years became history.  
1.2. Mainstream Theories 
Most of historians and economists hold different attitudes toward the effects of rising silver price 
on prewar Chinese economy. The most general accepted explanation is from Friedman and 
Schwarz. In their book Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 they claimed that in 
the outset of the Great Depression, Chinese economy indeed benefited from the silver standard 
as it isolated depression from other gold standard countries through financial transmission effects. 
Improvements in trade situation reflected improvement in Chinese real economy. Then the 
exorbitant silver price mainly induced by the federal government seriously enhanced Chinese 
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trade deficits which stimulated silver outflow as a counterpart of trade balance. In sum, 
Friedman’s main points were the silver standard initially benefited the economic growth of 
China and later dragged the economic condition into downturn spirals.  
However, some macro-economic indicators did not show obvious decreases as indicators of 
depression. Aggregated estimates of China’s GDP showed that output merely contracted by 9% 
in 1934. Industrial index fluctuated differently by industries. Cotton-spinning, silk and cigarettes 
experienced a considerable shrink while tea, flour and cement industrials performed favorable2.  
Hence these controversial figures stimulated the view of Chinese economy escaped the curse of 
high silver price and experienced gradual development. A representative economist who held 
this view is Thomas Rawski. He utilized quantity monetary theory to estimate monetary velocity 
in China. Then based on the “U-Shape” monetary velocity development theory, he concluded 
China had hardly suffered from depression after 1934. In order to show his theory, he 
recalculated Chinese monetary stock by three components- monetary metal, banknotes and bank 
deposits. Then he compared the data from China proper3 and Manchuria4 to illustrate the relative 
relationship of monetary velocity in these regions. Since the degree of industrialization in 
Manchuria was much higher than the national average level, and based on the “U-shape” theory 
(in the beginning stage of industrialization, the faster velocity decreasing rate means the higher 
industrial level), the faster calculated velocity decreasing rate of China proper obeyed the theory 
above. Hence Rawski believed the velocity of China proper was underestimated. According to 
quantity money theory, velocity equals to the quotient of PT and M, where P, T, and M 
represents Price Index, Real GDP and Monetary Stock respectively. If the national velocity was 
more than the actual data, the only reason could be the Real GDP was understated. His detailed 
Monetary stock data gathering process and trusty Price Index guaranteed the certainty of 
undervaluing Real GDP, which verified Chinese economy had not experienced great 
depression.5  
The third main explanation of Chinese economy during the 1930s comes from Chang Pang, he 
supported Friedman’s view of the silver standard protected Chinese economy from exogenous 
shock from 1929 to 1931. But he disagreed with Friedman on the explanation of the reason why 
silver flight happened in China. Friedman attributed silver outflow to enhance Chinese trade 
deficits, while Chang supported international silver speculation stimulated silver exports.  
2 Central Bank of China, An Economic Survey of China for 1934 (Shanghai: Central Bank of China,1935) 
3 China proper: a term used by western researchers to express the core regions of China. The contents of this concept 
changed through dynasties changing.  In this paper, China proper represents the regions controlled by the Nanking 
government. 
4  Manchuria, collectively known as Manchouguo, was a puppet state in the northeast China and Inner Mongolia. In 
1931, Japan conquered the place and installed a pro-Japanese government one year later.  After Japan was defeated 
at the end of World War II (1945), Manchoukuo was transferred to Chinese administration in the following years. 
Under the administration of imperial Japan , economic condition of Manchoukuo experienced rapid growth. Its 
industry system was among the world industrial powerhouses and many Manchurian cities were modernized during 
Manchukou era. 
5 Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth In Prewar China (California : University of California Press,1989), 179 
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 1.3. Aim and Outline 
One of the main factors caused controversial opinions of prewar China’s economic performance 
was the accuracy of prewar economic statistics data. Due to frequent warfare and unstable 
political situation, statistics gathering work was underdeveloped in prewar China. Furthermore, 
before the 1935 currency reform, Chinese monetary system did not utilize uniformed unit of 
currency and most business centers circulated their own prevailing currencies. All these factors 
blurred the accuracy of gross economic indicators.  
In order to show the real economy situation in prewar China under the silver standard, trusty 
raw data and quantitative methods were utilized in this paper. Based on the author’s previous 
research and carefully data flittering process, the author chose the Quantity Index Number and 
Price Index Number of exports and imports (1867-1936) from Ho Lian because he compiled 
these indexes in 1930s and published them for research purpose. The original data all generated 
from China Customs Trade Yearbook and China Customs Trade Report. He used Fisher's 
Formula for Index Numbers to calculate quantity and price index number of Chinese trade. Then 
he modified these indexes by long-term economic growth trend (quadratic polynomial) and 
deduced Adjusted Quantity Index Number and Price Index Number of exports and imports in 
prewar China.  
Based on his precious original data, a modified long-term economic trend line was calculated 
through comparing R squares of polynomial in different orders. Finally the modified long-term 
economic trend adopted quartic polynomial. After calculating new adjusted index data, the 
general conclusion of trade condition in prewar China was drawn based on the theory that if the 
adjusted index data above the long-term economy growth line, the trade condition was better 
than predicted. Combined with detailed analysis of imports and exports, a general conclusion of 
prewar Chinese economy was in favor of the view from Friedman. The silver standard indeed 
benefited Chinese economy from 1929 to 1931, while after the U.S. silver purchase act, the 
performance of adjusted trade index went bad which means the Chinese economy suffered from 
economic down turn.  
However, were these changes caused by rising international silver prices? In order to figure the 
question out, the author conducted OLS regression of silver price to adjusted trade index in four 
comparative time periods. The regression results in the last two periods (1921-1936, 1927-1936) 
showed the same significant results in Adjusted Quantity Index number of Exports and Adjusted 
Price Index number of Imports. And the coefficient level increased in the second period which 
means the silver price had a higher impact in the 1930s. Adjusted Price Index number of Imports 
had a negative correlation with silver price, which was easy to understand. As price index 
represented nominal price annually, rising silver price did not contribute to increase in silver 
purchase power but offset by decreases in nominal price. However, in Adjusted Quantity Index 
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number of Exports part, it was positive correlation with silver price, which obeyed the rules that 
increases in exports price depresses cost advantages and lowers exports quantity.  A possible 
explanation of this was the Adjusted Quantity Index number of Exports contained contributions 
from silver exports. In order to answer this question, the author conducted OLS regression of 
silver outflow amount to Adjusted Quantity Index number of Exports and Unadjusted Quantity 
Index number of Exports. The regression results showed acceptable correlation between silver 
outflow and Unadjusted Quantity Index number of Exports, the indicator not presents long-term 
economy growth trend but short-term shock. The opinion supported the view from Chang that 
Chinese silver flight was not caused by trade deficits as Freidman said, but by the international 
silver speculation. 
Then the paper had a detailed introduction to silver speculation situation of China from 1932 to 
1936. As U.S. silver purchase act in June 1934 planned to triple the silver price, Chinese silver 
outflow started to surge after that.  Pattern of silver exports transformed from legal method to 
illegal smuggling because of a series of capital control policies announced by government since 
October 1934. The main export ports changed from Shanghai to boundary ports like Canton or 
Tientsin where conducted relative loosened governmental supervisions. Japan and the United 
Kingdom functioned as the main intermediaries transporting Chinese silver to America. And 
eventually Chinese 1935 monetary currency stopped silver flight.  
The main contribution of this paper to previous work was to analyze prewar trade condition 
separately in price and quantity data. It was inaccurate to utilized gross export and import trade 
data to analyze a country’s trade situation. Since each commodity had its own price and the price 
was fluctuating with time, especially when the currency exchange rate experienced dramatic 
changes like prewar China, the gross trade data may diminish the influence of real price changes 
on trade situation. In the same way, price trade data could not represent changes in quantity 
sector because the components of trade framework were not unchangeable. Dividing the analyze 
angle into price and quantity was necessary and impetrative.  
The general conclusion of this paper was that the prewar Chinese economy indeed benefited 
from the silver standard from 1929-1931, then since the Britain abandoned the gold standard 
especially due to the U.S silver purchase act, Chinese economy was seriously impaired by 
international silver price and experienced economic downturn spirals. The considerable silver 
outflow was attributed to international silver speculation instead of trade deficits.  
This paper will be organized as follows: Section II reviews previous research methods and 
mainstream views of prewar Chinese economy. Section III introduces theory background, data 
gathering process, quantitative research model combined with analyses. Section IV explains the 
quantitative results in historical background-Chinese banking system, monetary system and 
further analyzes silver speculation in China. Section V draws a general conclusion, research 
limitation and further research directions.   
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2 
Literature Review 
2.1. Friedman’s Theory 
Until now, the most influential interpretation of the Chinese economic performance under the 
silver standard was from Friedman and Schwartz. To start the argument, Friedman claimed that 
the silver standard benefited the Chinese economy at the beginning years of the Great Depression, 
but Britain and the United States went off the gold standard stopped China’s growth trend by 
competitive devaluation. True, prices in terms of dollars or other prevailing currencies were 
rising, which offset the impact of China’s currency appreciation. But U.S. silver purchase act 
accelerated Chinese exchange rate to rise much faster than price index, resulting in continuous 
downturn spirals of Chinese exports and increasing trend of silver capital flight.  Large-scale 
exports of silver, which they thought as a counterpart to an increase in Chinese trade deficit, 
directly drained Chinese money stock. Compared to other countries began to recover from the 
shallow of depression, Chinese economy entered into the phase of internal depression because of 
the silver currency shortage in the late 1930s. When the Chinese central government could 
hardly maintain silver convertibility, the government had to give it up and conducted a fiat 
standard in 1935.6 
There were other contemporary observers offering primary materials that supported the idea 
above. The U.S. financial adviser to China (1929-1947) Arthur N. Young reported to the federal 
government that “China passed from moderate prosperity to deep depression.”7 In February 1934, 
Chinese Nanking government negotiated with the federal government to dispatch an observer to 
China, who could authentically deliver the information of Chinese serious economic condition 
back. Sir Ar-thur Salter, who was assigned and visited China, reported that: 
There are great dangers and difficulties in any departure from the present silver basis of 
the Chinese dollar. Without that, however, China can only escape the injury of further 
deflation if silver ceases to rise substantially in relation to the foreign currencies and to 
the world prices of commodities. The principal factor is the U.S.'s silver policy. It seems 
important, therefore, that China (whose real interest in silver is overwhelmingly greater 
than that of any other country) should make her position clear to the Government of that 
country. 8 
6 Milton Friedman, and Anna J. Schwartz, Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 ( Princeton: Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1963), 461-489  
7 Arthur N. Young, Chin's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 1937-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1965), 209 
8 Sir Arthur Salter, China and Silver (New York: Econ. Forum, 1934), 108-9. 
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American mainstream media also mentioned depressed situation of Chinese economy. The 
New York Times reported that China, as a country adhered to the silver standard, was not benefit 
from the increasing silver prices as the congress previously promised. On the contrary, inflated 
silver price did not boost the purchasing power of Chinese buyers but reduce it. Predictable 
future silver price prompted international speculation and further promoted smuggling of silver 
from China. At this stage, Chinese economy was suffering from massive depression9.  
 Other observers expressed the same opinions. In December 12, 1934, Sir A. Cadogan 
(Shanghai) wrote a telegraphy to Sir J. Simon10, which said: 
Managers of Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and Secretary of Messers.  Liming Chan 
Chaiao and Tsu Yee-pei of Bank of China and Mr. Sing Loh-hus of National Commercial 
Bank have all approached me in regard to monetary situation here. They all agree that the 
present state of affairs gives cause for grave anxiety for the stability of the currency. 
Chinese bankers hold that flexible duty system has failed in its object and has even 
encouraged outflow of silver by artificially maintaining differences between rate of 
exchange here and price of silver abroad…There have also been large shipments to South 
China and … and that considerable shipments have gone abroad from the Colony. 
Anxiety of Chinese Government on this point is shown by their request for an embargo 
upon export from Hongkong. Native bank interest rates here recently rose as high as 14.6 
percent per annum and there is a general shortage of silver in circulation and contraction 
of credit.11  
Except for these contemporary records, researchers also conducted lots of academic work on 
this issue. Greenwood and Wood calculated the macro-economic data of China during the time 
period from 1926 to 1933. They stated that Chinese price index of agricultural production shrank 
from 100 in 1926 to 57 in 1933. High exchange rate reduced the cost advantage of Chinese 
exports. Without sound revenues, Chinese industries came to a halt with a low level of economic 
activates. Higher financial cost and fixed-interest loans hindered domestic industrials to maintain 
manufacturing, which contributed to high unemployment and proletarian resists.12.  The banking 
system in China was challenged as well.  The failure of 148 native banks nationally reflected 
severe economic situation in 1935.  Most of Chinese banks preserved strong links with industries 
and issued real-state based loans. Falling real estate values created knotty problems in 
maintaining bank liquidity. Leavens observed that since many banks held high proportions of 
loans mortgaged on real estates, devaluating value of rest estates forced banks to get rid of old 
loans early and raised the interest rate of new loans as the price of default risks. Without efficient 
9 Milton Friedman, “Franklin D.Roosevelt, Silver and China,” Journal of Political Economy 100, no.1.(1992): 74 
10 Sir A. Cadogan was the Ambassador from the United Kingdom to the Republic of China; Sir J. Simon worked as 
Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain. 
11 W.N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin, ed., Documents On British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 (London: Her Majesty' 
Stationery Office, 1984), 366-367. 
12 John G. Greenwood and Christoper J.R Wood, “The Chinese Hyperinflation : Pary 1. Monetary and Fiscal Origins 
of the Inflation, 1932-45,” Asian Monetary Monitor 1, no.1. (Sept.-Oct. 1977): 32 
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cash flow, individuals and banks found themselves possess frozen assets on hands, which were 
precipitated by the financial difficulty.13  
2.2. Rawski’s Theory 
However, recent researches on prewar China’s economy had demonstrated a series of reasoning 
that was inconsistent with the above views. Their disagreements focused on whether high silver 
price acted as a disaster to Chinese economy and whether Chinese economy experienced 
depression in the 1930s. Rawski believed that China had hardly experienced prolonged 
depression after the U.S. silver purchase act and Chinese currency reform in 1935 indeed 
promoted the real economy development. Although silver outflow happened in prewar China, 
increasing circulation of banknotes that were redeemable for silver offset the impact of silver 
flight and replenished monetary supply. But this over-issued paper money later contributed to the 
hyperinflation during the Sino-Japanese War. He drew the above conclusions based on his 
calculation of Chinese monetary velocity from 1918 to 1936. He compared related data in two 
geographical scales- China proper and Manchuria. He found that the velocity curve of Manchuria 
experienced continuously decline, which matched the typical feature of velocity in newly 
developing industrial counties- the faster economy developments, the sharper curve declines.  
However, the curve of China proper showed a ‘U-shape’ bottomed at the year of 1934, and then 
it had a slight increase afterwards (Appendix B).  
The “U-shape” theory could be explained as follows: many industrialized countries have a 
well-defined pattern of velocity behavior. The development curve of money velocity is “U-
shaped” (illustrated in figure 2.1. below). In the initial industrialization process, the curve 
represented a declining trend, then an intermediated flat segment and finally followed by a rising 
tendency.  In the early period of economic development, most countries experienced decline of 
money velocity because of institutional changes involving the increasing usage of money in 
transactions, assisted by the geographical spread of bank subsidies network and rising bank 
credits.  Economy participators gradually accepted the liquidity of paper currencies and using 
bank accounts to hold large deposits.  Then after an adjustment process, money velocity started 
to go up as monetization process eventually completed. A relative stable economic condition 
enabled rising permanent incomes, which stimulated the public or businessmen to hold less 
currency at hand and invest more in real economy because the financing channel was effective 
and available. The final stage represented financial sophistication and improved economic 
stability.  
13 Dickson H. Leavens, Silver Money (Bloomington,Ind.: Principia, 1939),59. 
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 Figure 2.1.  Income Velocity of Money (M2) in the United States, 1870-1975 
Source: Data from Michael D. Bordo and Lars Jonung, The long-run behavior of the velocity of 
circulation: the international evidence (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, 1987) 5. 
If as suggested by “U-shape” theory, velocity declined because of economic and financial 
development, why does Manchuria, an region where the industrialization level was more 
sophisticated compared to the national average level, showed substantially higher velocity than 
the nation as a whole? The answer was the decreasing trend of national velocity curve should be 
less sharp. The national velocity value was understated. According to the quantity money theory, 
monetary velocity can be calculated as: 
Monetary Velocity = 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘  
If the actual national velocity should be more than the calculated data, the reasons could be the 
Real GDP was undervalued, Price Index was undervalued or Monetary Stock was overvalued. 
But Rawski’s detailed Monetary stock data gathering process and trusty Price Index guaranteed 
the only possible reason was the undervaluing Real GDP, which testified Chinese economy had 
not experienced great depression.14 
 However, Friedman rejected Rawski’s theories based on following points. Firstly, the initial 
data were hardly creditable for underdeveloped country as China, let alone the credibility of final 
compiled data. Second, in Rawski’s data gathering process, he had not mentioned the amount of 
currency circulated in domestic nonfinancial activities, which influenced the calculation of 
monetary velocity. Finally, the M2 decline was overstated because Rawski did not consider a 
14 Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth In Prewar China (California: University of California Press, 1989),179. 
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decrease in silver reserves held behind bank notes. These reasons represented the Chinese real 
GDP had not been understated as Rawski predicted.15 One year later, Rawski rewrote another 
small paper to defend his theory. He said even though Friedman criticized he did not classify 
money stock between bank sector and non-bank sector, which resulted their final money stock 
data were incredible, it was hard to define “what is a ‘credible’ composition for national 
monetary aggregates.”. And he further criticized validity of Friedman’s empirical data, which he 
said “ although the Chinese ratio of currency to M2 for the 1930s is lower than the figures that 
Friedman cites for a grab bag of nations (Nepal, Chad, Yeman, Zaire, etc.[77]), it is hard 
remarkable in the East Asian context.” 16  Against the view from Friedman that China’s economy 
experienced sharp reductions in money supply, prices and output during the 1930s, Rawski 
restated the reality of Chinese economic life during the 1930s was resilience of free market, in 
which economic entities could hold free selecting rights.  
 Brandt (1985) interpreted the deflation of Chinese currency was not duo to the monetary 
contraction as Rawski states, but to the international silver speculation. The prices in China were 
not fixed but very flexible. So as silver, which worked as commodity in international market, its 
price fluctuation may result in price changing as China adhering to silver standard.17 There years 
later, Brandt and Sargent (1988) further developed their theory and offered an alternative 
explanation. The massive exports of silver were not as a consequence of a sudden decrease in the 
trade balance, but as expenditure of a windfall gains because of silver appreciation. Chinese 
central bank did not need previous amount of silver reserves to support an unchanged real 
balanced level as the silver price increased. There was no deflation, no economic depression at 
all. The reason why Nanjing government conducted currency reform in 1935 is to increase their 
share of capital gain resulting from silver’s appreciation.18 
2.3. Chang’s Theory 
Chang explained that the reason behind Chinese large silver outflow neither due to a growing 
trade deficits nor a windfall gain, but because of speculative sales of silver, which caused the 
Chinese silver standard to collapse. As he stated, even though silver prices started to rise early in 
1931, it was not until 1934, when the federal government issued the silver purchase act that 
promised speculators a predictable increasing price growth trend.  Besides, Chinese government 
planned to take drastic actions if the international silver price continued to surge.  On one hand, 
predicable speculative profits were ensured by series of American bills which were authorized to 
15 Milton Friedman,” Franklin D.Roosevelt, Silver and China,” Journal of Political Economy 100, no.1 (Feb., 1992): 
77.nn.18. 
16 Thomas G. Rawski,” Milton Friedman, Silver, and China,” Journal of Political Economy 101, no.4 (Aug., 1993): 
756. 
17 Loren Brandt,” Chinese Agriculture and the International Economy, 1870-1930s: A Reassessment,” Explorations 
in Economic History, no.22 (1985): 168-193. 
18 Loren Brandt and Sargent Tomas J. “Interpreting New Evidence about China and U.S. Silver Purchases,” Journal 
of Monetary Economics23, no.1 (1989): 31-51. 
10 
 
                                                          
increase international silver price, on the other hand, nationalization of silver reserves threatened 
the interests of silver holders, especially foreign banks. These factors stimulated domestic silver 
holders to export silver. Hence, foreign banks and native banks tried to seek opportunities to 
export silver abroad, at first through legal channel but later they try to take smuggling method. 
When Chinese government conducted tighter capital controls, foreign banks even took use of 
military warship to evade tax. Rumors of silver shortage stimulated the public incentive to 
redeem paper for silver.  In face of the danger of bankruptcy, Chinese central government had to 
curry out monetary reform to stabilize the domestic monetary system. 
 As for whether exorbitant silver price did damage to Chinese real economy, Chang believed 
that China’ economy indeed was hurt during the year from 1933-1935. However, to some extent 
the damage was not fully caused by increasing silver prices. For instance, certain key industries 
like cotton spinning and silk reeling experienced adverse price. These damages were mainly led 
by impacts from Japanese mills within China. And the reason why Chinese government 
conducted the currency reform later in the November 1935(one and half year later than the U.S. 
silver act) was the Nanking government should wait for an opportunity when the silver price 
climbed up to a point where the public could no longer bear. Then they could take some dramatic 
measures like nationalizing all silver reserves and establishing the fiat system to unify currency 
system. And he believed that large silver outflows from China were caused by speculative sales 
of silver instead of trade deficit or a windfall gain.19  
  
19 Pang H.K. Chang,” Commodity Price Shocks and International Finance”( Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 1983),2-151. 
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3 
Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Theoretical Background 
According to Ho Lian’s theory, it was necessary to distinguish the difference between 
fluctuations in quantity data and price data when precisely analyzing a country’s trade 
condition20. Every bulk commodity owned its specific price and the price was changing with 
time. Hence, quantity data could not reflect changes in price. In a similar way, components of 
China’s foreign trade were not unchangeable, which means quantity trade data should be 
analyzed separately. Besides, as prewar China adhered to the silver standard, fluctuations in 
silver purchasing power may influence the interpretation of Chinese trade situation. For instance, 
the purchasing power of one silver dollar in 1931 merely equaled to 0.62 silver dollar in 1913. 
The situation could be more complex when considering exchange rates between countries using 
the silver standard and the gold standard. In sum, differentiating quantity data and price data was 
essential and imperative.21 
Thanks to Ho’s hard work; he calculated the Quantity Index number and Price Index number of 
imports and exports in China from 1867 to 1936. The original resource was collected from China 
Customs Trade Yearbook and China Customs Trade Report. He set the beginning year as 1867 
because the China Customs Offices uniformed unit of account as haikwan tael since then. Before 
1867, statistics data compiled from each province were recorded in different currencies such as 
Mexico silver dollar, Shanghai silver dollar, etc.  
3.2. Data Collection 
3.2.1. Unadjusted Index Number 
The chosen commodities can be divided into two groups- directly included goods and indirectly 
included goods. In China Customs Trade Yearbook and China Customs Trade Report, most of 
foreign trade goods were illustrated precisely by price and value. However, certain special goods 
lack clear unit of measurement. Hence, these commodities should be grouped separately. The 
percentage of directly included goods’ value to the gross trade value was presented in the 
20 Daye Wu, ”Reasons and effects of Gold and Silver Price Fluctuations.” Nan-k’ai chih shu tzu liao hui pien, 1913-
1952[ Compendium of Nan-k’ai index number materials] (Peking: China Social Sciences Press, 1988): 634. 
21 Lian Ho, “ Zhongguo liu shi nian jin chu kou wu liang zhi shu wu jia zhi shu ji wu wu jiao yi zhi shu [ Quantity 
Index Number and Price Index Number of Chinese trade, 1967-1936],” in Nan-k’ai chih shu tzu liao hui pien, 1913-
1952[ Compendium of Nan-k’ai index number materials] (Peking: China Social Sciences Press, 1988), 552-572. 
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Appendix D.1.  Generally speaking, the value of directly included goods accounted for over two 
thirds of gross trade value. There were also special treatments. First, indirectly included goods 
lack precise price and quantity data; it was necessary to make assumptions to track their growth 
trends. The primary assumption was the growth rates of indirectly included goods equal to those 
of directly included goods. Second, among directly included goods there were certain 
commodities whose prices fluctuated more than 50 percent annually. Those goods should be 
excluded when calculating the growth rates of directly included goods.  
 The index compiling method was based on Fisher's Formula for Index Numbers, which 
combined the Laspeyres Index Numbers and Paasche Index Numbers. The aggregates combined 
then quantities and prices of trades in a given year with those in a base year. Ring Price Index 
was used. Ho’s modified index calculating formulas and a calculation instance were illustrated in 
Table 3.1. 
Quantity Index Number0 = �∑𝑞1𝑝0∑𝑞0𝑝0 × ∑𝑞1𝑝1∑𝑞0 𝑝1 
Price Index Number0 = �∑𝑞0𝑝1∑𝑞0𝑝0 × ∑𝑞1𝑝1∑𝑞1𝑝0 
When  𝑝1 = the price of any commodity in the given year 
           𝑞1 = the quantity of amy commodity in the given year              p0 = the price of that commodity in the base year               𝑞0 = the quantity of that commodity in the base year 
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Table 3.1. Calculation Instance of Quantity Index Number and Price Index Number 
  The Value of Imports      (Hankwan Tael, MM) 
 Year 0 Year 1 
Directly Included Goods 
  
Actual Value 
�𝑞0 𝑝0 
 
 
�𝑞1𝑝1 
 
 
Total Value 845 795 
Drastically Value-fluctuating Goods 2 2 
Other Goods 843 793 
Value Calculated by P0 
�𝑞0𝑝0 
 
 
�𝑞1𝑝0 
 
 
Total Value 845 721 
Drastically Value-fluctuating Goods 2 1 
Other Goods A843 B720 
Value Calculated by P1 
�𝑞0 𝑝1 
 
 
�𝑞1𝑝1 
 
 
Total Value 875 795 
Drastically Value-fluctuating Goods 2 2 
Other Goods a873 b793 
Indirectly Included Goods 
  Actual Value 130 120 
Value Calculated by P0 130 109* 
Value Calculated by P1 135# 120 
 
  Total Value of Imports 
  
Value Calculated by P0 
�𝑞0 𝑝0 
 
 
�𝑞1𝑝0 
 
 
            Drastically Value-fluctuating Goods 2 1 
Directly Included Goods 843 720 
Indirectly Included Goods 130 109 
Total 975 830 
Value Calculated by P1 
�𝑞0 𝑝1 
 
 
�𝑞1𝑝1 
 
 
Drastically Value-fluctuating Goods 2 2 
Directly Included Goods 873 793 
Indirectly Included Goods 135 120 
Total 1010 915 
Notes: *:109 = 120 × 𝐵
𝑏
= 120 × 720
793
                                                       #: 135= 130 × 𝑎
𝐴
= 130 × 873
843
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Quantity Index Number of Imports = �∑𝑞1𝑝0∑𝑞0𝑝0 × ∑𝑞1𝑝1∑𝑞0𝑝1 = �830975 × 9151010 =0.8782 
Price Index Number of Imports = �∑𝑝1𝑞0
∑𝑝0𝑞0
× ∑𝑝1𝑞1
∑𝑝0𝑞1
= �1010
975
× 915
830
=1.0686 
The ratio of actual value of imports = 915
975
=0.9385 
Quantity Index Number of Imports × Price Index Number of Imports = 0.8782 × 1.0686 = 0.9385 
 
Table 3.2. Quantity Index Number and Price Index Number of Chinese Trade, 1867-1936        (1913=100) 
Year 
Quantity Index Price Index 
Year 
Quantity Index Price Index 
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 
1867 24.7 31.9 46.9 45.1 1902 70.9 65.1 78 81.7 
1868 25.4 33.7 46.9 51.7 1903 65.1 59.8 88.3 89 
1869 26.4 35.4 47.9 47.8 1904 69.2 64 87.2 92.7 
1870 25.9 33.3 46.7 46.1 1905 96.6 62.5 81.2 90.4 
1871 28.1 39.4 47.4 47.2 1906 95.3 64.6 75.4 90.6 
1872 27.9 43.3 45.8 48.7 1907 88.7 67.1 82.3 97.6 
1873 27.3 39.1 46.3 49.6 1908 72.7 73 97.4 94.1 
1874 31.5 40.1 38.5 45.9 1909 77.1 92.9 95.1 90.5 
1875 33.8 42.2 35.3 40.6 1910 79.2 102.9 102.5 91.8 
1876 36.3 42.8 33.8 47.1 1911 80.9 102.1 102.2 91.5 
1877 36.1 40.8 35.5 40.8 1912 82.8 103.8 100 88.5 
1878 34.9 41.4 35.7 40.2 1913 100 100 100 100 
1879 40.8 43.2 35.2 41.3 1914 91.6 83.8 108.9 105.4 
1880 36.4 47.2 38.3 41.1 1915 70.3 96.5 113 107.8 
1881 40.8 43.5 39.6 40.5 1916 73.7 102.3 122.4 117 
1882 36.4 45.9 37.6 36.2 1917 73.4 108.3 131 106.2 
1883 35 47.2 37.1 36.8 1918 66.1 105.5 147 114.5 
1884 34.5 50.6 37.1 32.9 1919 75.4 140 150.2 112 
1885 40.5 47.6 38.1 33.9 1920 75.9 119.3 175.7 122.9 
1886 35.3 54.2 43.3 35.3 1921 94.7 126.9 167.4 117.8 
1887 41.6 41.2 43 51.8 1922 112.6 130.5 146.8 124.7 
1888 50.3 43.6 43.6 52.4 1923 108.5 137.3 148.7 136.3 
1889 44 45.2 44.3 53.3 1924 119.6 136.6 148.8 141.2 
1890 54.8 42 40.7 51.5 1925 109.9 132.9 151 145.9 
1891 60.8 47.9 38.7 52.3 1926 130.5 141.1 150.8 152.9 
1892 59.9 49.8 39.6 51.4 1927 109.8 154.1 161.7 148.9 
1893 59.4 57.2 44.7 50.8 1928 131.5 156.1 159.1 158.4 
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Year 
Quantity Index Price Index 
Year 
Quantity Index Price Index 
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 
1894 45.3 60.1 62.8 52.8 1929 139.9 149.2 158.1 169.8 
1895 45.8 66.3 66.1 53.5 1930 131 131.1 174.7 170.4 
1896 53.2 56.4 67.1 57.7 1931 129.9 136.5 192.9 166.3 
1897 49.7 61.6 71.8 66.1 1932 106 100.8 180.1 140 
1898 51.3 63.4 71.9 62.3 1933 97.5 124.7 173.2 121.4 
1899 69.2 62.5 67.2 78 1934 85.1 118.6 151.9 111.6 
1900 49.5 54.9 74.8 72.1 1935 83.6 126.7 138.1 110.4 
1901 62.5 59.8 75.3 70.6 1936 77.9 125.6 152.3 139.2 
Source: Data from Nan-k’ai chih shu tzu liao hui pien, 1913-1952[ Compendium of Nan-k’ai index 
number materials] (Peking: China Social Sciences Press, 1988), 375. 
3.2.2. Adjusted Index Number  
According to the theory from Ho, economy development followed a pattern which he named as 
long-term economic growth curve.  Technology creation, population booming, banking system 
stretching and nature resources utilization all contributed to improvement in social productivity, 
which resulted in permanent influence on real economy. For example, if actual imports data in 
two continuous years declined but both above the predicted economic growth curve, it 
represented better economic situation instead of bad performance. Hence, predicting economic 
growth trend was critical to reevaluate economic performance and trade statue of China, 
especially during the time period from the Great Depression to the Sino-Japanese war. To revise 
the index calculated above, Ho utilized quadratic polynomial curve to predict long-term 
economic growth trend of China. Then he defined the points on the curve equal to 1, and utilized 
deviation from the trend to adjust the original index.  The polynomial long-term economic 
growth trend he used was illustrated as follows, together with the example of the figure of 
Adjusted Quantity Index number of Imports, 1867-1927. 
Table 3.3. Polynomial Long-term Economic Growth Curve  
 
Coefficient 
 
Formula 
 
X2 X Constant 
 
 
Quantity Index Number of Imports 0.0148 1.1112 46.0806 
 
Y=0.0148 X2+1.1112X+46.0806 
Price Index Number of Imports 0.0040 0.7637 64.7682 
 
Y=0.0040 X2+0.7637X+64.7682 
Quantity Index Number of Exports  0.0118 0.8896 58.8746 
 
Y=0.0118 X2+0.8896X+58.8746 
Price Index Number of Exports 0.0105 0.8490 64.0926   Y=0.0105 X2+0.8490X+64.0926 
Source: Data from Nan-k’ai chih shu tzu liao hui pien, 1913-1952[ Compendium of Nan-k’ai index 
number materials] (Peking: China Social Sciences Press, 1988), 557. 
Notes: all the formula above fit for index data using 1867 as base period 
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Figure 3.1. Unadjusted Quantity Index Number of Imports in China, 1867-1927 
 
 Figure 3.2.  Adjusted Quantity Index Number of Imports in China, 1867-1927 
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3.3. Research Method and Analysis 
The primary research question of this paper is to evaluate whether Chinese economy experienced 
depression from 1927-1936, which expanded previous Ho’s research time span (1867-1927). 
However, in the prewar China, data statistics work were undeveloped especially due to frequent 
wars and unstable political conditions. Hence, Ho’s Quantity Index Number and Price Index 
indeed Number contributed a lot to the following researches. Based on these previous original 
data, I used a modified polynomial trend line to predict long-term economic growth line of China. 
After lone-term analysis, a general conclusion of Chinese economic condition from 1927 to 1936 
could be reached. And then I calculated OLS regression of silver price, quantity of silver 
outflows and trade indexes to further analyze the exact reason of Chinese silver flight after 1934. 
3.3.1. Modified Polynomial Trend Line   
Ho’s long-term economic growth trend was calculated in form of quadratic polynomial. 
However, based on my calculation of R squares of different orders, quadratic polynomial was not 
the best fitted curve to predict long-term economic growth. I chose quartic polynomial. The R 
square increasing rates between quartic polynomial and quintic polynomial were less than 0.5 
percent in data of Price Index Number of Imports and Quantity Index Number of Exports. But 
the calculation amount of quantic polynomial was much more than that of quartic polynomial. 
Hence, quartic polynomial was an acceptable revising curve. The relative R square data of each 
index were illustrated in Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4. R Square of Polynomial Curve in Different Orders 
  Order R2 R2 IR Formula 
QII 
2 0.8089 
 
y = 0.0004x2 + 1.3619x + 18.577 
3 0.8259 2.10% y = -0.0006x
3 + 0.0672x2 - 0.5509x + 30.294 
4 0.8430 2.07% y = -4E-05x
4 + 0.0045x3 - 0.1659x2 + 3.1891x + 16.171 
5 0.8656 2.68% y = -2E-06x
5 + 0.0004x4 - 0.0219x3 + 0.5432x2 - 4.2121x + 35.429 
    
 
PII 
2 0.9191 
 
y = 0.0294x2 + 0.176x + 34.016 
3 0.9566 4.08% y = -0.0015x
3 + 0.1857x2 - 4.2926x + 61.388 
4 0.9635 0.72% y = -4E-05x
4 + 0.0036x3 - 0.0484x2 - 0.5375x + 47.208 
5 0.967 0.36% y = -1E-06x
5 + 0.0002x4 - 0.0125x3 + 0.3862x2 - 5.0729x + 59.009 
    
 
QIE 
2 0.8844 
 
y = 0.0166x2 + 0.5456x + 31.417 
3 0.9090 2.78% y = -0.0009x
3 + 0.1139x2 - 2.2367x + 48.459 
4 0.9492 4.42% y = -7E-05x
4 + 0.0085x3 - 0.3175x2 + 4.6831x + 22.329 
5 0.9523 0.33% y = -1E-06x
5 + 0.0001x4 - 0.0033x3 - 0.0011x2 + 1.3808x + 30.922 
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  Order R2 R2 IR Formula 
PIE 
2 0.8815 
 
y = 0.0193x2 + 0.4404x + 35.878 
3 0.9278 5.25% y = -0.0013x
3 + 0.1601x2 - 3.5852x + 60.537 
4 0.9355 0.83% y = -3E-05x
4 + 0.003x3 - 0.0395x2 - 0.3833x + 48.447 
5 0.9432 0.82% y = -2E-06x
5 + 0.0003x4 - 0.0165x3 + 0.4875x2 - 5.8835x + 62.758 
Notes: QII: Quantity Index Number of Imports in China 
 PII:  Price Index Number of Imports in China 
       QIE: Quantity Index Number of Exports in China 
             PIE:  Price Index Number of Exports in China 
             R2 IR: R Square Increasing Rate 
Based on these new modified polynomial trend lines, I recalculate the Adjusted Quantity Index 
Number of Imports, Adjusted Price Index Number of Imports, Adjusted Quantity Index Number 
of Exports and Adjusted Price Index Number of Exports in China. The detailed data are in table 
3.5., and the following figures represent the results of modified quartic polynomial long-term 
growth trends and adjusted indexes. Then the final figure 3.3 to figure 3.10. focus on the revise 
data from 1927-1936. 
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Table 3.5. Adjusted Quantity and Price Index Number in China, 1867-1936 
Year Imports Exports Year Imports Exports 
RQII RPII RQIE RPIE RQII RPII RQIE RPIE 
1867 1.2865 1.0059 1.1946 0.9391 1902 1.1125 1.0477 1.0100 1.1137 
1868 1.1587 1.0203 1.1052 1.0874 1903 0.9915 1.1331 0.8922 1.1674 
1869 1.0836 1.0584 1.0490 1.0166 1904 1.0229 1.0697 0.9175 1.1702 
1870 0.9755 1.0493 0.9121 0.9921 1905 1.3858 0.9528 0.8605 1.0988 
1871 0.9858 1.0836 1.0147 1.0283 1906 1.3270 0.8469 0.8539 1.0610 
1872 0.9223 1.0656 1.0626 1.0741 1907 1.1989 0.8858 0.8514 1.1019 
1873 0.8583 1.0962 0.9241 1.1073 1908 0.9542 1.0054 0.8893 1.0249 
1874 0.9487 0.9271 0.9207 1.0366 1909 0.9831 0.9426 1.0870 0.9518 
1875 0.9811 0.8638 0.9479 0.9268 1910 0.9816 0.9766 1.1571 0.9332 
1876 1.0205 0.8393 0.9460 1.0856 1911 0.9751 0.9372 1.1043 0.9000 
1877 0.9867 0.8930 0.8915 0.9481 1912 0.9714 0.8838 1.0808 0.8431 
1878 0.9304 0.9077 0.8978 0.9402 1913 1.1428 0.8529 1.0036 0.9239 
1879 1.0636 0.9024 0.9325 0.9702 1914 1.0207 0.8976 0.8116 0.9455 
1880 0.9296 0.9872 1.0166 0.9676 1915 0.7646 0.9015 0.9032 0.9402 
1881 1.0224 1.0230 0.9364 0.9533 1916 0.7832 0.9465 0.9267 0.9935 
1882 0.8958 0.9701 0.9885 0.8497 1917 0.7632 0.9835 0.9512 0.8792 
1883 0.8466 0.9525 1.0175 0.8590 1918 0.6733 1.0732 0.9000 0.9256 
1884 0.8204 0.9443 1.0919 0.7615 1919 0.7535 1.0681 1.1623 0.8854 
1885 0.9469 0.9576 1.0276 0.7759 1920 0.7454 1.2191 0.9659 0.9517 
1886 0.8112 1.0706 1.1694 0.7965 1921 0.9154 1.1353 1.0041 0.8951 
1887 0.9394 1.0419 0.8872 1.1491 1922 1.0732 0.9750 1.0116 0.9315 
1888 1.1154 1.0316 0.9353 1.1396 1923 1.0216 0.9690 1.0453 1.0027 
1889 0.9574 1.0199 0.9639 1.1334 1924 1.1147 0.9533 1.0241 1.0249 
1890 1.1691 0.9088 0.8882 1.0681 1925 1.0162 0.9530 0.9839 1.0472 
1891 1.2706 0.8357 1.0018 1.0555 1926 1.2000 0.9396 1.0348 1.0875 
1892 1.2250 0.8247 1.0272 1.0072 1927 1.0066 0.9969 1.1231 1.0518 
1893 1.1876 0.8958 1.1603 0.9647 1928 1.2052 0.9729 1.1347 1.1140 
1894 0.8846 1.2086 1.1954 0.9701 1929 1.2857 0.9613 1.0858 1.1920 
1895 0.8726 1.2196 1.2892 0.9496 1930 1.2111 1.0590 0.9593 1.1973 
1896 0.9880 1.1853 1.0692 0.9882 1931 1.2125 1.1692 1.0090 1.1730 
1897 0.8990 1.2130 1.1355 1.0912 1932 1.0028 1.0947 0.7566 0.9946 
1898 0.9030 1.1609 1.1335 0.9906 1933 0.9391 1.0592 0.9561 0.8717 
1899 1.1845 1.0363 1.0814 1.1939 1934 0.8386 0.9380 0.9350 0.8130 
1900 0.8235 1.1016 0.9175 1.0619 1935 0.8476 0.8644 1.0349 0.8194 
1901 1.0100 1.0590 0.9636 1.0004 1936 0.8178 0.9705 1.0727 1.0576 
Notes: RQII: Adjusted Quantity Index Number of Imports in China 
            RPII: Adjusted Price Index Number of Imports in China 
            RQIE: Adjusted Quantity Index Number of Exports in China 
            RPIE: Adjusted Price Index Number of Exports in China 
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Figure 3.3. Quantity Index Number of Imports in China, 1867-1936 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Adjusted Quantity Index Number of Imports in China, 1867-1936 
y = -4E-05x4 + 0.0045x3 - 0.1659x2 + 3.1891x + 16.171 
R² = 0.843 
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 Figure 3.5. Quantity Index Number of Exports in China, 1867-1936 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Adjusted Quantity Index Number of Exports in China, 1867-1936 
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 Figure 3.7. Price Index Number of Imports in China, 1867-1936 
 
 
Figure 3.8. Adjusted Price Index Number of Imports in China, 1867-1936 
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 Figure 3.9. Price Index Number of Exports in China, 1867-1936 
 
 
Figure 3.10. Adjusted Price Index Number of Exports in China, 1867-1936 
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 Figure 3.11. Adjusted Quantity and Price Index Number in China, 1927-1936 
 
 
Figure 3.12. Value of China's Imports and Export, Classify by Ports, 1926-1935 
Sources: Appendix D.3 
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Period I (1929-1930): China’s real economy indeed benefited from the silver standard at the 
outset of the Great Depression as Friedman stated. Most of trade index curves in figure 3.11. 
were above the long-term economic growth trend. Severe depression weakened other golden 
standard countries’ real economy. The price of silver in New York silver market declined sharply 
from 0.53 cents per ounces (1929) to 0.29 cents per ounces (1931)22.  As China adhered to the 
silver standard, falling silver price led to a decline in the exchange rate of the Chinese dollar. 
From 1929 to 1931, the exchange rate fell by 48% against the U.S. dollar and 41 % against the 
pound. Meanwhile, American price index fell by 23%， British fell by 30%, implying the 
decline in Chinese currency was greater than the combined influence of foreign exchange rate 
and domestic price index increase, which means China experienced a real depreciation. 23 
Depreciation promoted Chinese exports even though the gross value of exports declined as 
illustrated in figure 3.12. First, Adjusted Price Indexes of Exports were 19.2, 19.7 and 17.3 
percent higher than the long-term predicted values in the year of 1929, 1930 and 1931 
respectively. This presented the nominal price of Chinese exports almost stayed the same during 
these three years. Meanwhile, real depreciation of Chinese currency combined with the same 
nominal price led to the real price of Chinese exports decreased against foreign currencies, which 
created cost advantage of Chinese exports. Second, Adjusted Quantity Index of Exports in China 
fluctuated around the long-term economic growth line. This illustrated Chinese exports volume 
was not seriously hurt by international depression but followed regular economy development 
pattern. Compared with the world average industrial activity which declined by 25 percent, 
Chinese exports indeed escaped from the Great Depression at the mercy of the silver standard. 
Then, for the imports sector, the gross import value experienced a rise as shown in figure 3.12.  
The Adjusted Price Index of Imports in China increased from 0.96 to 1.17, which might offset 
the advantages of real currency depreciation. But if we combined the factors of falling exchange 
rate and rising nominal imports price together, the real cost of import goods almost stayed the 
same as well. Together with the falling Adjusted Quantity Index of Imports data, the real gross 
exports value declined in this time period. All these analyses show the view of Friedman that in 
the early years of the Depression, China was spared the economic downturn spirals suffered by 
other countries.  
Period II (1931): Chinese economy started to decline. British departure from the gold standard 
reversed the growth trend of Chinese economy. British central government officially suspended 
gold convertibility and conducted currency depreciation in September 1931. Three months later, 
Japan left the gold standard together with other countries in the sterling bloc. This preluded the 
abandons of gold standard globally and the battle of competitive depreciation. Silver prices 
started to increase, companied with the exchange rate of Chinese currency. From 1931 to 1932, 
Chinese currency appreciated 23.7% against the pound and 70.1 % against yen. But the prices 
22 Appendix D.3 
23 Pang H.K. Chang,” Commodity Price Shocks and International Finance”( Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 1983), 93. 
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abroad were falling or constant. Hence Chinese currency experienced real appreciation.24 For 
export part, gross export value fell about 45%, the Adjusted Quantity Index of Exports fell about 
25% and Adjusted Price Index of Exports fell about 15.4. Real appreciation weakened 
competitiveness of Chinese exports. What’s worse, in 1931 Japan conquered Manchuria, a 
region contributed about one third of Chinese exports further impaired domestic economy. For 
import part, Adjusted Quantity Index illustrated a decreasing trend, which means appreciated 
Chinese currency did not transform into purchasing power. And real appreciation led to decline 
in nominal import price. Combing these factors together, gross import value of China declined 
sharply as illustrated in figure 3.12. 
Period III (1932-1933): Chinese economic performance continued to decline. In the 1932 U.S. 
presidential election, Franklin D. Roosevelt criticized Hoover’s defense of the gold standard 
which proponed overdue recovery process of U.S. economy in the Great Depression.  One of his 
new plans was to suspend gold convertibility and devaluate dollars to curry out inflationary 
policy. In order to win the election, two groups of political powers could not be ignored by 
Roosevelt. They are the silver bloc and farm bloc. Milton Friedman stated in his journal that: 
Before the election, the 14 senators from the seven states producing the bulk of the silver 
were evenly divided: seven Republicans and seven Democrats. The Roosevelt sweep left 
only two Republicans versus 12 Democrats, and one of the Republicans, William E. 
Borah of Idaho, has long been a staunch supporter of silver… Similarly, the farm state 
allies of the silver bloc gained strength and could hardly be ignored by the president.25  
These seven states were major U.S. silver primary origins- Utah, Idaho, Arizona, Montana, 
Nevada, Colorado, and New Mexico. One-seventh of the votes were controlled by senators from 
these regions.26 Roosevelt never forgot his campaign promise -“do something for the silver.” 
After winning the election, Roosevelt paid off the voting support from the silver and the farm 
states by issuing a series of commodity prices rising polities. On May 12th 1933, Thomas 
Amendment was passed. It was aimed at restricting agricultural production by providing 
subsidies to farmers, increasing Federal Reserve notes and doubled the amount of high-powered 
currency. On December 21, 1933, the President ratified the Pittman London Silver Amendment, 
which commanded the U.S. mints to purchase the entire domestic newly mined silver at 64.5 
cents per ounce, the price equaled to half of statutory price but 20 cents more than market price. 
This act played as the first step to reduce the amount of private owing silver. And it enabled 
Treasury took the balance of statutory price as a book profit for monetizing the silver. American 
a series of silver price rising policies further worsen Chinese international trade. Declines in 
adjusted imports price, adjusted imports quantity and adjusted export price show the downturn. 
Adjusted Quantity Index Number of Exports in China showed a sharp increase in 1932. One 
24 Pang H.K. Chang,” Commodity Price Shocks and International Finance”( Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 1983), 45. 
25 Milton Friedman, “Franklin D.Roosevelt, Silver and China,” Journal of Political Economy 100, no.1.(1992): 65 
26 Theodore J. Kreps,” The Price of Silver and Chinese Purchasing Power,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 48 (Feb. 
1934): 246. 
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possible explanation was the falling export price stimulates foreign demands of Chinese exports. 
But the real appreciation of Chinese currency may offset price advantage. Another explanation 
was the rising international silver price stimulated speculation, which contributed to the quantity 
of exports. But whether silver outflow contributed to increase in the Adjusted Quantity Index 
needs further analysis. 
Period IV (1934): Chinese economy became even worse. In spite of Adjusted Quantity Index 
Number of Exports above the long-term economic growth line, all the other trade indicators 
bellowed the predicted points. This situation effectively testified that Chinese economy 
experienced depression later in the 1930s, which objected Rawski’s theory. Booming 
international silver price was mainly caused by the U.S. silver purchase act on June 19, 1934. As 
the climax of these series of expansionary polities, Silver Purchase Act was signed by President 
Roosevelt and the contents of Silver Purchase Act were claimed as follows:  
The Silver Purchase Act “directed the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase silver at 
home and abroad until the market prices reached $1.29+ an ounce, or until monetary  
value of the silver stock held by the Treasury reached one-third of the monetary value of 
the gold stock. The Secretary was given wide discretion in carrying out that mandate.27  
 
In 1933 the market price of silver is 45 cents, while the silver bloc successfully lobbied the 
congress to accept the arbitrary purchase value ($1.29 an ounce) by asserting that increased 
silver price could promote purchase power in silver standard counties like Mexico and China. 
This in turn created a massive trade market for American exports which stimulated U.S. 
economy recovery. Actually, obligatory federal purchase at $1.29 offered a considerable 
governmental subsidy to silvering industry. What’s more, another tricky part of this act was to 
maintain the fixed ratio between gold and silver revers. At the time silver purchase act was 
passed, purchasing 1.2 million ounces of silver was enough to satisfy the fixed ratio requirement. 
But with federal gold stocks climbing up, at the end of 1934 another 125 million ounces of silver 
should be brought by Treasury. 28 
American silver purchase act actually caused the international silver price from 0.35 cents per 
ounce to 0.48 cents per ounce, which increased by 37% in a year. Correspondingly, Chinese 
Adjusted Price Index of Imports decreased about 7.9% while the Adjusted Price Index of Exports 
remained the same. For the import part, declining nominal import prices were offset by real 
appreciation. The relative stable imports volume together with stable real imports price means 
the real gross imports value of China remained the same. For the export part, the stable adjusted 
nominal export prices combined with real appreciation means the real price of exports remained 
the same. Together with increasing adjusted quantity index of exports, the real gross exports of 
27 Milton Friedman, and Anna J. Schwartz, Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 ( Princeton: Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1963), 127.nn.6 
28 John Morton (M.) Blum, From The Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Crisis, 1928-1938 (Boston: The Riberside Press 
Cambridge, 1959),189. 
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China in 1934 should be increased. Increased real exports revenue and stable real imports cost 
should narrow the balance of payment in China. This analysis rejected Friedman’s theory of 
silver outflow was caused trade deficits. So why did massive of silver outflow from China?  
Period V (1935): Chinese trade situation started to recovery. As the massive silver flight 
drained Chinese silver reserves, Chinese government announced to conduct currency reform in 
November 1935, which aimed to suspend silver convertibility and unified monetary system. 
Instead of using the silver standard, China started to adhere to the fiat standard. Rising in 
adjusted export price and quantity boosted gross export values. And decline in gross import 
values as illustrated in figure 3.12 showed the recovery process of Chinese economy, especially 
the Adjusted Quantity Index of Exports and Adjusted Priced Index od Exports above the long-
term growth line, which means they performed better than predicted. However, all the above 
analyses based on the assumption that international silver price has a significant impact on 
adjusted trade data. In order to show their correlation and coefficient, OLS regression analysis 
should be further analyzed. 
3.3.2. OLS Regression Analysis 
To start, it was better to review major indexes of silver price globally. There were two primary 
silver price indexes- London silver price and New York silver price. From 1870 when most of 
countries in the world started to utilize the gold standard, silver prices were impacted by relative 
fluctuations in gold prices. As the United Kingdom and the United States were all gold standard 
countries, their domestic economic situations especially their treatment of gold standard could 
influence their currency value, which further impacted the accuracy of silver price recorded in 
this currency. For example, London silver price started to be recorded since 1833.29 From 1915 
to 1918, British government conducted capital control policy which suspended gold 
convertibility and forbidden gold exports. The U.K domestic gold prices were higher than the 
level abroad; hence its silver price indexes could not accurately represent silver price in 
international market. After the World War I, Britain experienced inflation; London silver price 
lost its representativeness during this time period as well. For New York silver price, since the 
United States continuously adhered to the gold standard during the World War I, hence its data 
could more precisely influence the silver prices fluctuations. But the influence of the U.S 
domestic economy to the silver price recorded in U.S. dollars could not be completely adjusted.  
Appendix D.2 illustrated the New York silver price. And the table 3.6. represented the regression 
results of New York silver price to these four series of trade indexes. The independent variable 
was New York silver price and independent variables were adjusted trade indexes.  
  
29 Pang H.K. Chang,” Commodity Price Shocks and International Finance”( Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 1983),634. 
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Table 3.6.: OLS Regression Results of New York Silver Price and Adjusted Trade Indexes, 1867-1936 
Independent Variable NYSL1867-1936 NYSL1867-1936 NYSL1867-1936 NYSL1867-1936 
Dependent Variable RQII 1867-1936 RPII 1867-1936 RQIE 1867-1936 RPIE 1867-1936 
     
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.0112 0.1319 0.0112 0.1996 
R Square 0.0001 0.0174 0.0001 0.0399 
Observations 70 70 70 70 
     
F 0.0086 1.2044 0.0086 2.8228 
Significance F 0.9265 0.2763 0.9265 0.0975 
     
Coefficients 0.0004 -0.0484 0.0004 -0.0776 
Standard Error 0.0457 0.0441 0.0457 0.0462 
t Stat 0.0926 -1.097 0.0926 -1.6801 
P-value 0.9265 0.2763 0.9265 0.0975 
     
Significant Reject Reject Reject Reject 
     
Independent Variable NYSL1913-1936 NYSL1913-1936 NYSL1913-1936 NYSL1913-1936 
Dependent Variable RQII 1913-1936 RPII 1913-1936 RQIE 1913-1936 RPIE 1913-1936 
     
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.518 0.1071 0.2615 0.3703 
R Square 0.2684 0.0115 0.0683 0.1371 
Observations 24 24 24 24 
     
F 8.0698 0.2551 1.6143 3.4951 
Significance F 0.0095 0.6185 0.2172 0.0749 
     
Coefficients -0.4433 0.0471 0.1167 -0.1922 
Standard Error 0.1561 0.0932 0.0919 0.1028 
t Stat -2.8407 0.5051 1.2705 -1.8695 
P-value 0.0095* 0.6185 0.2172 0.0749 
     
Significant Accept Reject Reject Reject 
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Independent Variable NYSL1921-1936 NYSL1921-1936 NYSL1921-1936 NYSL1921-1936 
Dependent Variable RQII 1921-1936 RPII 1921-1936 RQIE 1921-1936 RPIE 1921-1936 
     
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.0401 0.6344 0.523 0.2055 
R Square 0.0016 0.4025 0.2735 0.0422 
Observations 16 16 16 16 
     
F 0.0225 9.4322 5.2702 0.6174 
Significance F 0.8828 0.0083 0.0377 0.4451 
     
Coefficients -0.042 -0.3593 0.3235 -0.1786 
Standard Error 0.2797 0.117 0.1409 0.2273 
t Stat -0.1502 -3.0712 2.2957 -0.7858 
P-value 0.8828 0.0083* 0.0377* 0.4451 
     
Significant Reject Accept Accept Reject 
     
Independent Variable NYSL1927-1936 NYSL1927-1936 NYSL1927-1936 NYSL1927-1936 
Dependent Variable RQII 1927-1936 RPII 1927-1936 RQIE 1927-1936 RPIE 1927-1936 
     
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.1313 0.8855 0.7127 0.1856 
R Square 0.0172 0.7841 0.508 0.0345 
Observations 10 10 10 10 
     
F 0.1404 29.0484 8.2592 0.2855 
Significance F 0.7176 0.0007 0.0207 0.6076 
     
Coefficients -0.1831 -0.6069 0.6268 -0.2168 
Standard Error 0.4887 0.1126 0.2181 0.4057 
t Stat -0.3747 -5.3897 2.8739 -0.5344 
P-value 0.7176 0.0007* 0.0207* 0.6.76 
     
Significant Reject Accept Accept Reject 
Notes: NYSL: New York Silver Price 
RQII: Adjusted Quantity Index Number of Imports in China 
RPII:  Adjusted Price Index Number of Imports in China 
RQIE: Adjusted Quantity Index Number of Exports in China 
RPIE: Adjusted Price Index Number of Exports in China 
*p<.05 
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As we can see from the regression results above, in the long-term (1867-1936) all the 
regression results were rejected. The situation was almost the same in time period from 1913-
1936, only the result for Adjusted Quantity Index Number of Imports was accepted. The reason 
for it was mostly because of the World War I, when most countries seek for silver as military 
usage. The silver price experienced surge increase sharply, booming from 0.51 cents per ounce 
in 1915 to 1.12 cents per ounce in 1919, the increasing rate was 119.61%. The sharp rise should 
be viewed as extreme situation. And more advanced statistical analysis could be used to modify 
data in the World War I and further evaluate long-term silver price’ influence on Chinese trade 
performance.-limitation. 
 
Figure 3.13. New York Silver Price and Adjusted Quantity and Price Index Number in China, 1921-1936 
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In the time period after the World War I, OLS regression showed the same results. The figure 
3.13. represents the growth pattern of silver price and trade indexes. The Adjusted Price Index 
Number of Imports and Adjusted Quantity Index Number of Exports were both significantly 
influenced by global silver price. What’s more, the absolute coefficients values of these two 
dependent variables were increased when comparing the time period from 1921 to 1936 and 
from 1927 to 1936. For Adjusted Price Index Number of Imports, coefficients changes from -
0.36 to -0.61, which means the rising silver prices enhanced the Chinese silver purchasing power 
with decline in imports prices. But the coefficient data for Adjusted Quantity Index Number of 
Exports changed from 0.32 to 0.63. The increasing silver price promoted Chinese exports, which 
was not corresponding with the view that rising silver price reduces exports’ cost advantages. 
Another possible explanation was the silver outflow after the silver purchase act contributed to 
the exports quantity. Hence, it was necessary to analyze the different influence of silver outflow 
on Adjusted Quantity Index Number of Exports and Quantity Index Number of Exports. The 
table 3.7. represented the regression results of these research question.  
Table 3.7. OLS Regression Results of Silver Outflow, RQIE and QIE, 1927-1936 
Independent Variable SO1927-1936 SO1927-1936 
Dependent Variable RQIE1927-1936 QIE1927-1936 
 
  Regression Statistics 
  Multiple R 0.287 0.6322 
R Square 0.0824 0.3996 
Observations 10 10 
   
F 0.7182 5.3249 
Significance F 0.4214 0.0499 
   
Coefficients 2.1099 0.0001 
Standard Error 2.4897 0.0003 
t Stat 0.8475 2.3076 
P-value 0.4214 0.0498 
   
Significant Rejected Accept 
Notes: SO: Silver Outflow 
            RQIE: Adjusted Quantity Index Number of Exports in China 
            QIE: Quantity Index Number of Exports in China 
According to the regression results in Table 3.7., silver outflow had a significant impact on 
unadjusted exports quantity index but no significant influence on adjusted exports quantity index. 
This represented the Chinese silver flight in the late 1930s were less linked to long-term 
economic growth, which was illustrated in adjusted exports quantity index. If silver outflow did 
not follow the economic growth trend, there was another explanation- short-term economic 
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shock, which was international silver speculation. The silver outflow in the 1930s, especially 
after the U.S. silver purchase act, promoted international silver speculation. Combined with 
historical archive documents; Chinese silver flight was motived more by speculation in domestic 
and international markets. This view was coincidence with Chang’s theory.  
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4 
Historical Analysis 
Before the author started the discussion of silver outflow situation of China from 1932 to 1936, it 
is necessary to go over the banking system and monetary system in prewar China. Generally 
speaking, prewar Chinese banking system mainly consisted of native banks, foreign banks and 
commercial banks. And the Chinese monetary system mainly consisted of monetary coins, like 
silver or copper, banknotes and bank deposits.  
4.1. Chinese Banking System 
In the prewar time period, Chinese banking system mainly consisted of three different but 
complementary parts: native banks, foreign banks and commercial banks. Extensive links 
between different types of banking institutions integrated the domestic market and stimulated the 
national to prosper. Owing entrenched social networks and long-term history of financing 
agrarian economy, native banks dominated prewar banking system. They offered foreign banks 
and commercial banks potential useful information about financial demand from Chinese 
customers. In return, they borrowed in short-term ready cash from the other two institutions and 
these inter-bank borrowing solved native banks’ cash shortage problem. The foreign banks 
mainly undertook bank services concerning international trade and exchange transactions. They 
cooperated with native banks by issuing banknotes and also worked together with commercial 
banks, which contacted more closely with central government. With the establishment of central 
banks in 1928, the China’s banking system formed a comprehensive and efficient framework 
combining rural areas and urban places together, which formed a solid institutional foundation 
for currency reform in 1935. 
4.1.1. Native banks  
Chinese agrarian economy created its own banking system prior to the modern banks emerged in 
the late nineteenth century. This traditional banking system consisted of ch’ien-chuang (native 
banks) and the Shanxi banks. The latter did not survive the Republication revolution of 1911 
while the former became the major component of prewar China’s banking system. This 
traditional Chinese banking system adapted to the agrarian economy well. Unlike industrial 
economy which appeared in the early twentieth century, China’s agrarian economy owned its 
instinct features.  Individual owners were engaged in small-scale farming; the costs and returns 
of agricultural products were seriously influenced by governmental policies and climatic 
conditions; seasonal production called for financial support intensively during the seeding and 
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harvest periods, and individual peasant household had little financial risk resistance capacity. 
Hence, in order to cater these needs, ch’ien-chuang offered various financial services through its 
interregional branches dispersing among major farming regions and commercial centers. 
Generally speaking, most of the native banks (ch’ien-chuang) were private owned. Individuals, 
partnership or small groups of shareholders undertook unlimited liability for the discharge of 
bank obligation. As Rawski Stated in his book that: 
 The ch’ien-chuang accepted deposits, extended loans and undertook direct investments 
in business ventures, conducted interregional transfers, prepared and accepted bills of 
exchange, issued banknotes and orders (promises to pay specific sums on specified future 
dates). Transferred funds among depositors, and preformed other functions associated 
with these services. Although free of government supervision, the ch’ien-chuang were 
subject to self-regulation through their own field, which also performed some central 
banking functions, including the provision of interbank clearing facilities in the largest 
commercial centers.30  
Compared to modern banks, ch’ien-chuang depended more on regional social networks and 
personal credits. It also maintained close links with industrial sector by direct investments and 
indirect personal connections. Direct investments often contained venture capitals, exchange of 
deposits and the granting of loans. Indirect personal connections usually happened between 
native bankers and industrialists. Bankers and entrepreneurs held shares of native bank and some 
firms employed former employees from native banks. Although foreign banks and commercial 
banks strongly challenged the deposit and loan business of native banks in treaty ports, ch’ien-
chuang still had a vital influence in interior areas. The following figure 4.1. illustrates the trend 
of total number of ch’ien-chuang and its capital storage from 1912 to 1936.  
As we can see from the figure 4.1., since the middle 1920s, ch’ien-chuang market experienced 
an integrating process- the total number of native banks was declining while the capital per unit 
continuously increased. Especially during the time period from the Great Depression to 1933, the 
operations of foreign banks were seriously impacted by their domestic economic recession. 
Native banks seized the opportunities and rapidly expanded capital. Until 1933, when the gold 
standard ultimately was abandoned by most countries, their economy recovery and international 
competitive depreciation slowed down the rate of silver inflows to China which further 
hampered the capital gathering process of national banks. Rise in silver price, especially the U.S. 
silver purchase act aggravated silver flight and lowered the total amount of capital storage back 
to the level almost 10 years ago. 
  
30 Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth In Prewar China (California: University of California Press, 1989),127. 
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 Figure 4.1. Shanghai Native Banks, 1912-1936 
Sources: Data from Appendix D.5  
4.1.2. Foreign banks 
In the wake of treaties that were designed to establish trade association with China, foreign banks 
penetrated into Chinese financing market initially functioned as intermediates for overseas 
exports and imports in treaty ports. The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, formed in 1864, was the 
first foreign bank set up to provide financial services to British merchants. With Chinese 
economy gradually involved in international trade market, more and more foreign countries 
opened up banks along China’s coastal trading regions. Until the Sino-Japanese war, fifty-three 
firms owned over 150 offices including overseas headquarters and local branches in China.31  
In spite of ordinary banking services like absorbing deposits, issuing bank notes, granting loans 
and transferring monetary assets, foreign banks conducted several special services. First of all, 
they monopolized currency exchange services. Owing irreplaceable advantages, foreign banks 
not only earned fees from currency exchange services, but also made substantial profits through 
31 Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth In Prewar China (California: University of California Press, 1989),130. 
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arbitrage in exchange rate fluctuations between Chinese silver standard and global gold standard. 
Their working capitals also generated from another four channels: a) Wealthy Chinese people 
deposited their surplus assets in foreign banks which provided a steady silver inflow. Because 
deposits in foreign banks undertook lower political risk and owned higher security against 
Chinese government unstable policies. b) A more important source was their roles in servicing 
China’s foreign debt and indemnity payments. c) They played as bankers to the foreign-
controlled Chinese customs system, which brought them an endless inflow of customs tax and 
salt receipts, which were used as reserves to offer loans to European lender. d) They also 
undertook intermediates of Chinese government overseas borrowing, and this enabled foreign 
banks to maintain an intimate contact with the central government.  
Foreign banks mostly concentrated in treaty ports and owned geographical proximity with 
native banks and commercial banks. In spite of spatial proximity, business cooperation enabled 
them to set up an extensive links among them. Native banks possessed wide-spread social 
network and valuable information that were essential to potential Chinese borrowers. However, 
they lacked enough ready cash which could be perfectly offset by short-term unsecured credits 
provided by foreign banks.  What’s more, most of Chinese tael was controlled by native banks. 
In order to exchange Chinese dollar for tael, foreign banks had to deposits certain amounts of 
capital in accounts of native banks. Inter-bank borrowing was common during this time period. 
However, since Japan attacked Shanghai in January 1932, fearing of silver removal conducted by 
foreign banks resulted in native banks suspending silver convertibility. They confined their 
business to ‘paper’ service without any negotiations. Despite these difficulties, foreign banks 
were viewed more stable and trustworthy than competing commercial banks. 
4.1.3. Commercial banks 
The financial impacts of the Republication revolution were not only terminated operation of 
Shanxi Banks as illustrated above, but also contributed to the spring tide of Chinese domestic 
industry. In the early 1910s, many famous entrepreneurs like Zhang Jian (the founder of Chinese 
modern oil industry) and Rong Zongjing (the founder of Chinese modern textile and flour 
industries) took an active part in penetrating financial sector to open up new capital channels for 
their companies. Is spite of entrepreneurs, blocs of vented interests like warlords and politicians 
also tried to pursue profits through capital operation.  Northern Four Banks and Southern Three 
Banks32 were typical representatives of successful commercial banks during the prewar interval. 
The establishers of these banks all had strong political and business backgrounds.  To some 
extent, Chinese commercial banks were born with intimate contact with central government.  
More than 100 new institutions were set up during the 1910s. And in the following two decades, 
the total number of Chinese commercial banks reached up to over 1600 units, covering 14 
32 Northern Four Banks represents Gold City bank, Salt Industry Bank, Middle-of-south Bank and Mainland Bank. 
Southern Three Banks means Chekiang Industrial banks, Chekiang First Banks and the Shanghai Commercial & 
Saving Banks.   
38 
 
                                                          
provinces. Most of subsidies were concentrated in treaty ports along coastal lines like Shanghai, 
Tientsin, Nanking and Canton. There were also some located in political center- Peking and 
Chungking (Appendix D.6, D.7). According to the Figure 4.2., certain provinces have high 
density of Chinese Commercial banks like Kiangsu, Hopei, and Chekiang and they represents 
commercial banks already achieved relative high degree of branches distribution.  While, some 
provinces like Kwangtung, Hupei, Szechwan, Shantung and Hunan owned smaller number of 
offices but high density. This means most of subsidies concentrated on treaty ports in each 
province. As far as Shanghai was concerned, there were approximately 500 branches gathered 
here, which accounted for one third of the sum subsidies nationally in 1936.Their network 
distribution had not stretched to rural areas in prewar China.  
 
Figure 4.2. Number and Density of Chinese Commercial Banks, 1936  
Source: Data from Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth In Prewar China (California: University of 
California Press, 1989),136. 
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services departments.  In order to achieve better capital operation and raise more railway 
construction funding, they established Bank of communications in Peking. In 1909 the bank 
began to issue banknotes, and in 1922 Zhang Jian (as introduced above) was resigned as bank 
manager, who transformed the deficits situation of the bank and gained surplus. After the 
Chinese republic became the official central government in 1928, the Bank of communications 
was moved to Shanghai and mainly offered financial services to administrative institutions in 
agriculture, mining, industry and trade sectors. The second government- controlled bank was the 
Bank of China. It was established in 1912 and its major business was to provide foreign 
exchange transactions. In 1929 it opened branches in London. And until now, the Bank of China 
is still the only official institution undertaking foreign exchange services in mainland China. The 
third bank was the Central Bank of China, which was organized in 1928. And the forth one was 
the Farmers Bank of China (1935). These four commercial banks acted as the currency issuing 
institutions in the monetary reform of 1935. 
Unlike foreign banks and traditional native banks, commercial banks invested large flows of 
funds into government bonds. Compared to private-sector loans, government loans owned lower 
investment risks but higher revenues.  Commercial banks regarded the government as their chief 
customer and government fiscal revenue became major source of fund. However, due to their 
extensive links with the Nanking government, commercial bank ethics was harmed by unstable 
monetary policies and turbulent political scenes. Governmental suspension of silver 
convertibility and excessive note issue shook public confidence in commercial banks in the late 
1930s.  
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4.2. Chinese Monetary System 
 
Figure 4.3. Components of Chinese Monetary System  
 
As is illustrated in figure 4.3., China’s monetary supply system could be divided into three parts- 
monetary metals, bank notes and bank deposits. 
4.2.1. Monetary Metals  
Monetary Metals consist of Silver and Copper. Before the 1935 monetary reform, Chinese 
monetary system utilized silver standard. Silver tael and silver dollar in together with copper 
token dominated monetary supply in the early 1910s. 33 However, China lacked nation-wide 
uniformed currency system.  Different commercial centers formed their own local units of 
account through long-time economic developments. Without effective and convenient medium 
of exchange, on one hand, interregional wholesale transactions were hindered and confined. For 
example, as Rawski described in his book, if a Shanghai merchant planned to purchase goods 
from Hankow (another important treaty port along the Yangzi River), he had to exchange 
33 Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth In Prewar China (California: University of California Press, 1989),157. 
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Shanghai currency because the seller would prospect payment denominated in local unit of 
account-Hankow tael. 34   In order to acquire Hankow tael from Hankow local financial 
intermediaries, the buyer would have to take delivery of silver or bank credits denominated in 
Shanghai tael.  Shifts in demand and supply of two currencies led to fluctuations in relative 
prices between them, which added exchange rate risks to large-scale wholesale trade. What’s 
more, since the Warlord Era, different military cliques issued their own currencies, which further 
disintegrated domestic market. On the other hand, the coexistence of silver dollar and silver taels 
caused inconvenience in the transaction and clearing processes. In actual receipts and payments 
processes traders utilized silver dollar. However, they used silver taels as bookkeeping accounts. 
Fluctuating exchange rates between silver taels and dollars resulted in unnecessary complexity 
and transaction costs. Besides, as most of major economies conducted the gold standard, 
overseas traders were faced with both changes in gold-silver exchange rate and fluctuations in 
silver dollar-tale relative prices. Hence, currency disunity slowed down the expansion of Chinese 
economy. 
As silver currency were usually used by large traders, financiers and industrialists, copper 
coins and notes demonetized in copper served residents of cities or peasants in their daily lives. 
Copper coins penetrated into social and economic activities more deeply. As Yang and Hu 
described that: 
Trade has been encumbered, and prices of many small articles have gone up rapidly 
because of shortage of copper coins. In rural markets, where coppers were more popular 
than [silver] yuan…rapid movement of prices in copper caused serious maladjustments in 
the rural price structure and made…economic condition[s] unstable.35  
  The mining process of copper coins often utilized used existing copper coins and added 
impurities when the silver prices relatively weakened. Hence, statistic figures on the number of 
copper induced uncertainty, which had caused debated among historians. However, the problem 
is not so serious when conducting research in monetary system of prewar china. Although copper 
acted as an important role in Chinese people’s living standards, their relatively small values per 
unit exerted negligible impacts on real economy compared to the influence from silver coins. 
Bloch evaluated that: 
At 100 actual copper cents (in principle equivalent to 1,000 of the traditional copper cash) 
to the silver dollar, the combined value of these coins would reach 9 billion silver dollars. 
However, by the mid-1930s, it took more than 300 copper cents to buy a silver dollar in 
Shanghai. In Szechwan, where the mints poured out huge numbers of inferior copper 
coins with high nominal values, 1560 copper cents were needed to obtain a silver dollar 
in 1931. 36  
34 Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth In Prewar China (California: University of California Press, 
1989),127.nn.6 
35 W.Y Yang and Kwoh-hwa Hu, “Problem of Copper Death,” Economic Facts 12(1939): 562,570. 
36 K. Bloch,” On the Copper Currencies in China,” Nankai Social and Economic Quarterly 8,no.3 (1935): 620-23. 
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4.2.2. Bank Notes and Bank Deposits 
Most of Chinese native banks owned the rights to issue banknotes, later the foreign banks started 
to issue banknotes as well. However, after the Chinese currency reform, bank notes in circulation 
were mainly issued by three commercial banks-the Bank of China, the Bank of Communication, 
and the Central Bank of China. 
According to the calculation from Rawski, Chinese monetary supply was illustrated in figure 4.4.  
 
Figure 4.4. Chinese Monetary Supply, 1910-1936 
Source: Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth In Prewar China (California: University of California 
Press, 1989),157. 
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4.3. Silver Speculation from China  
 
Figure 4.5. Silver Net Exports from China, 1934-1935 
Sources: Appendix D.4 
China’s silver started to outflow since 1932, when the silver exports amounted to Ch$ 10 
million. In 1933, the figure climbed to Ch$ 14 million, but the situation did not become truly 
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shown in the figure 4.5., silver net exports peaked at Ch$ 80 million at August and the yearly 
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policies to control silver flight, such as raising export duty on silver to 10 percent in October, the 
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Most of silver exported in 1934 attributed to silver destocking by foreign banks37 during the 
time period from 1929 to 1932. In these three years, low silver price in the international market 
discouraged foreign banks to convert silver to foreign currencies. Silver reserves in foreign banks 
shank from Ch$ 275.7 million (1933) to Ch$ 221 million, and the annual decline rate reached 
85%. Meanwhile, Chinese commercial banks, especially “Central Bank Group”38 absorbed silver 
reserves released by foreign banks Ch$ by 35.5 million. Large amount of silver flowed in 
Chinese domestic market further contributed to domestic deflation situation caused by low silver 
price international.  
However, with the U.S. silver purchase act taking into reaction in June 1934, the silver price 
growth trend became predictable and exploitable. American target silver price is 1.29 dollar per 
ounce, while the spot silver price in New York market merely 0.454 cents per ounces in June. 
Tripling silver price gave international speculators confidence to take long positions. These 
speculators mainly consisted of foreign banks in China and individual silver holders. They 
transformed their silver assets in exchange for foreign currencies and made great profits. 
However, the trend of silver outflow not only promoted merely by predictable silver price, the 
fear of government capital control also stimulated silver holders to transform their money for 
safety. Although the Chinese Nanking government assured to maintain silver convertibility in 
case of massive bank run, industrialists and businessmen stack to their own judgments especially 
with stricter control methods gradually issued by central banks. Regardless of whether they 
expected increase or decrease in future silver price, they would opt to transform their silver 
assets abroad for safety. The third group of investors lack confidence in realization of the U.S. 
target silver price and they believed silver price might experience another down turn spiral if the 
U.S. domestic economy could not afford the cost of maintaining the target silver price in 
international market. For them, the optical potion was to transform silver to foreign currencies. 
They would do the exchange business with foreign banks, who took the main actor in silver 
exporting, or selling silver in the international market themselves.  The last group of participants 
was Chinese public citizens, they were influenced by rumor prevailing in markets that large-scale 
bankruptcy might occur and silver shortage might harm their rights to convert paper notes they 
holding on hand. Converting paper notes to silver then sell silver for foreign currencies or only 
reserve silver on hand both drained silver reserves of Chinese monetary system. 
In face with severe situation, Chinese government had to take measures to control the risky 
domestic economy. Within china, they conducted export restriction on silver since October 1934. 
These series of policies included export tax on silver raised to 10% and variable equalization 
charge was imposed. Individuals could not carry more than Ch$ 50 silver when travelling abroad. 
And licenses were required for coastal shipment of silver. The only legal silver exporters 
37  Pang H.K. Chang,” Commodity Price Shocks and International Finance”( Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 1983),47. 
38 Central Bank Group consists of Central Bank of China, Bank of China, Bank of Communications and Farmers Bank 
of China.  
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confined to banks intermediaries.  However, these restrictions all based on maintaining silver 
convertibility, which could not effectively stop the silver exports but resulted in two results. On 
one hand, legal silver exports turned into underground. On the other hand, previous main silver 
export port- Shanghai lost its advantages to many boundary treaty ports where loosen 
supervision conducted. Japan and Britain, the two countries acted as mainly silver transporters 
from China to the United States, their basements in China-Manchuria and Hong Kong became 
primary transmit pots for smuggling silvers. As we can see from the figure 4.6., the volume of 
silver exported from Shanghai gradually declined from October 1934 then a sharp decline in the 
beginning of 1935. While the national figures experienced a sudden drop in November, exactly 
after the Chinese government announced the export constrains policies. These figures seem 
peculiar and abnormal. If the national net silver export lowered than the value of Shanghai, one 
explanation was imports value in November largely surpassed export value. However, due to our 
analysis of Chinese trade situation in the previous chapter,   in 1934 Chinese trade deficit was 
narrowed because of relative increase in exports. Hence, there was only one explanation, which 
was the legal net silver exports data illustrated in the figure were seriously understated the illegal 
silver amount. But how to verify whether Shanghai lost its previous advantage as we discussed 
above.  
 
Figure 4.6. Silver Net Exports from Shanghai and Nation, 1934-1935 
Sources: Appendix D.4 
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A possible way to show this view was to compare silver price in each treaty ports. Statistics on 
internal silver inflow showed that monthly net silver exports from Shanghai to non-shanghai 
areas increased from Ch$ 0.7 million in September to C$ million in October , Ch$43 million in 
November and Ch$ 35 in December. 39 This massive silver transported to other interior treaty 
ports to further export abroad. An example was Canton, a treaty port near Hong Kong, where the 
prevailing currency Canton Tael contained less silver compared to Shanghai Tael, the relative 
price of the former should be less than the latter. However, after mid-October 1934, Canton Tael 
started to appreciate against Shanghai Tael, and by May 1935, Canton Tael even worth more 
than Shanghai Tael.40 This irregular appreciation exactly explained silver smuggling discrepancy. 
As Canton Tael was only convertible in Canto and Shanghai Tael was only convertible in 
Shanghai, the fluctuation in their relative price showed changes in demand of silver in each 
region. Strict government capital control lowered demand for silver in Shanghai and more silver 
smuggled in Canton illustrated increased demand for silver. In sum, the place where more silver 
smuggling conducted the higher price of local silver.  
When the fears of silver shortage finally stimulated the Chinese central government made up 
their minds to suspend silver convertibility and issued paper currency as a new monetary system, 
in 2 November 1935, the first large-scale monetary reform conducted in China. All silver 
reserves were nationalized, and three commercial banks had the right to issue new currency. All 
previous circling banknotes stopped to be used and the new currency exchange rate did not peg 
with any foreign currency. This is the first time Chinese monetary system utilized a uniform 
currency which had a profound impact in Chinese monetary history. Since then Chinese silver 
flight had been effectively confined.  
  
39  Leang-Li T’ang, Chinese’s New Currency System (Shanghai: Chinese United Press,1936), 71. 
40 Pang H.K. Chang,” Commodity Price Shocks and International Finance”( Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 1983),56. 
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5 
Conclusion 
The main research question of this paper is to investigate whether prewar Chinese economy 
experienced economic down turn under the silver standard. Based on the adjusted trade data and 
historical archive documents, the general conclusions of these paper are illustrated as follows. 
From the long-term economy growth analysis, prewar Chinese economy indeed benefited from 
the silver standard from 1929 to the beginning of 1931, then with the Britain going off the gold 
standard in mid-1931 followed by most of countries during the following two years, relative 
rising silver price changed Chinese trade condition. Especially after the U.S. silver purchase act 
issued in 1934, high silver price seriously dampened Chinese economy.  
In period I (1929-1930), Chinese real economy indeed benefited from the silver standard at the 
outset of the Great Depression as Friedman stated. Falling silver prices led to decreases in 
exchange rate of Chinese currency, which was more than the combined effect of appreciation in 
foreign currency and price index fall. This means China experienced a real appreciation. In the 
exports part, adjusted nominal price level remained the same together with a real appreciation, 
Chinese exports’ real price decreased which turned into exports’ cost advantage against foreign 
competitors. The reserved export quantity data fluctuated around the long-term economic growth 
line which means the growth of Chinese exports followed the predicted economic growth pattern 
instead of being seriously hurt by international depression like other countries under the gold 
standard. In the imports part, although the nominal import price increased, it could be offset by 
currency appreciation. Together with falling adjusted import quantity, the total import value was 
declining. Both import sector and export sector were improved in these years, which supported 
the view from Friedman that the silver standard helped Chinese economy escape from depression.  
In period II (1931), Chinese economy started to decline. Britain went off the gold standard 
followed by other countries increased silver price which led real appreciation in China. Adjusted 
exports quantity and price data both declined. And Japan conquered Manchuria where 
contributed one third exports from China in this year. Decreasing adjusted import quantity 
reflected appreciation in Chinese currency did not bring in improvement in silver purchasing 
power. Together with decline in adjusted import price, Chinese import endured sharply decline 
in 1931.  
In period III (1932-1933), Chinese economy condition continued to decline. Roosevelt’s “do 
something for silver” led to a series of policies aimed at rising silver price.  Chinese currency 
kept on appreciating, and declines were shown in adjusted import prices, import quantity and 
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adjusted export price. And in the same year, Chinese started to have net silver outflow, which 
contributed to the increase in adjusted export quantity data. 
In period IV (1934), Chinese economy became even worse. Except for revise export quantity 
data, all the other adjusted trade data lie far below the long-term economy line, which means 
their actual figures were much worse than the predicted values of healthy economy growth. In 
the June 1934, the federal government issued the U.S. silver purchase act caused massive silver 
outflow from China. The annual net silver outflow amount was Ch$ 256 million, which was 
almost 20 times compared to the data in previous year. Silver flight contributed to increase in 
adjusted export quantity data but if excluded this factor, Chinese export and import situation 
went bad. 
In period V (1935): Chinese economy started to recover due to the currency reform in 
November. Adjusted export price data and adjusted export quantity data both above the long-
term economic growth line in the next year. Nominal gross export value increased and nominal 
gross export value decreased, which means a narrow gap in trade deficits.  
In order to verify the influence of silver pressure on adjusted trade data, four groups of 
comparative regression analysis were carried out. The latter two groups showed the same 
statistics results. Silver price had a significant negative correlation with adjusted import price 
index. And it also had a significant positive correlation with adjusted export quantity index, 
which is against the general rule that appreciation in a country’s currency may harm its export 
amount due to loss in cost advantage. Hence, the following OSL regression testifies the 
correlation between adjusted export quantity index, unadjusted quantity index and silver net 
exports amount. The regression results showed the silver outflow had a significant correlation 
with unadjusted quantity index, which did not represent long-term economic development. 
Hence, silver flight had no significant correlation with long-term economic development but 
with short-term economic shock- speculation. This analysis process verified Chang’s theory that 
prewar Chines silver outflow was not due to gap in trade deficits as Friedman said but to the 
international speculation. 
For the short-term analysis of speculation in Chinese silver, there were four groups of 
participants. Firstly, pure speculators, such as foreign banks, they arbitraged between 
international silver market and Chinese domestic silver market. Predictable silver growth trend 
promised by the U.S. target silver price $ 1.29 per ounce strengthened their confidence of 
holding a position. The second group of silver holders was the ones who were afraid of gradually 
stricter governmental capital control methods, especially possible policies like nationalizing 
silver reserves, suspending silver convertibility or issuing paper money without enough reserves 
to back up. They transported their silver asset abroad for the sake of safety. The third group of 
people was the ones who lack confidence in the continuous rise in silver price. They preferred 
foreign currencies which were less risky. They sold silver to bank intermediates which also 
contributed to silver outflow. The final group of participants was public citizen stirred up by 
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rumors in markets. They were worried about shrinking silver reserves could not afford the 
convertibility of paper notes. Hence, they swarmed into banks for silver, which was hold on hand 
or sold to foreign banks for foreign currencies. Their behavior accelerated the draining process of 
Chinese silver reserves and speculation was the primary factor. 
Another conclusion of silver flight in China was the way of transforming silver abroad changed 
from legal exports to illegal smuggling. This was due to the strict policies issued by the Chinese 
government such as exposing tax and equalization charge on exports or issuing export licenses 
within bank intermediates. Silver export port changed from Shanghai to boundary treaty ports 
like Canton and Tientsin, where next to the smuggling silver transmission pots of Hong Kong 
and Manchuria. And the official legal silver net export data underestimated the actual silver 
export amount of China.  
Since the lack of trusty statistic data in prewar Chinese economy, this paper offered a series of 
trade indexes which could be further utilized by following researchers. And the major 
contribution of this paper to previous researches was the analysis of Chinese trade performance 
in price data and quantity data separately. Compared with gross trade data, price and quantity 
trade data may offer more detailed information about Chinese trade situation, especially during 
the 1930s when Chinese currency exchange rate fluctuated a lot due to the silver price increase. 
The main limitation of this paper is the lack of the significant regression results of long-term 
silver price’s influence on adjusted trade data. Because the World War I increased the silver 
demand for military usage, international silver prices increased from 0.51 cents per ounce in 
1915 to 1.12 cents per ounce in 1919. This striking situation distorts long-term regression results. 
Then, further analysis should eliminate the influence of high silver price in the World War I and 
analyze the general rigidity of Chinese trade indicators.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Breakdown of the Gold Standard  
After five years of floating exchange rate, major economic entities reset to the gold standard in 
the late 1920s. The figure 1 illustrates the numbers of countries on the gold standard briefly. If 
France’s stabilization (1926) marks the beginning of this reestablishment process, the British’s 
deprecation of sterling (1931) represents the prelude of massively going off the gold standard. 
By 1932 the international monetary system was spilt into tri-polars: the sterling bloc (Britain and 
other countries pegged to sterling); the Central and Eastern countries which led by Germany and 
conducted capital control; the residual gold-standard bloc, led by the United States and other 
unclassified countries like Japan and Canada.  In the same year, Franklin D. Roosevelt defeat 
Herbert Hoover in the presidential election and carried out several monetary policies that 
induced the U.S. economy to give up the gold standard.  Competitive currency depreciation, 
deterioration in international trade, wide fluctuations in exchange market and large-scale 
depression characterize the interval of early 1930s.  
 
Figure 1: Number of Countries on the Gold Standard, 1921-37.  
Source: Data from Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary 
System (Princeton: Princeton University Press,2008) 63.  
 
The breakdown of the gold standard attributes to its instinctive flaws. The rate of international 
gold supply could hardly catch up with the rate of economy development, especially in the 
economic recovery process.  Gold shortage constrains central banks to augment money stock to 
stimulate economy, which is due to the principal of maintaining gold reserves to note ratios 
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under the gold standard. Besides, the World War I enabled the United States replace Britain 
becoming the world’s leading creditor. In the beginning of the Great Depression, the Federal 
central banks held more than 40 percent of global gold reserves and postwar reparations and 
European reconstruction accelerated this gold concentration process. Gold and foreign exchanges 
flowed into the vault of Fed strengthened balance of payment but weakened that of other 
counties, especially the ones continuously suffering from deficits like Britain.   
 
Figure 1  Gold Reserves of Central Banks and Governments, 1931-1935 (percent of total) 
Source: Data from Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary 
System (Princeton: Princeton University Press,2008) 46.  
 
Britain once owned imperial overseas markets. And its economic growth largely depended on 
international trade. Unlike Germany, whose banking system formed a tight connection with 
industry, the banking revenues of Britain were mostly generated from foreign investments, 
earnings from shipping or financial services rendered to foreign trade.41 According to the data in 
the above Figure 1, gold reserves of British central bank (Bank of England) started to decline in 
the late 1920s and fell to a trough at 4.9 percent in 1932.  This result is due to several reasons. 
Firstly, since 1930 capital control and trade embargo had been conducted by most countries to 
protect domestic industries and insulate foreign competitors.  With the shrinking revenue from 
abroad, the British central bank found it tough to maintain gold exchange rate. What’s worse, in 
order to absorb economic bubble arose from the Wall Street, the federal government increased 
interest rates to prevent the capital flight since 1928.  On one hand, tighter monetary policy 
41 Source: Data from Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press,2008) 78. 
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indeed slowed down the gold outflow, however, on the other side, it not only reduced the pace of 
economy recovery in the United States but also aggravated strains on other countries who stick 
to the gold standard.  Correspondingly,   higher interest rates enhanced the attraction of foreign 
investments in U.S. fixed-interest securities while raised the costs of other countries borrowing 
money from the United States.  All these factors drained the gold reserves of Britain, and in 1931 
when the British central government could hardly maintain the fixed exchange rate of sterling, it 
announced to suspend gold convertibility and depreciate the sterling, which marked the ending of 
gold standard in Britain. 
After countries in the sterling bloc followed the steps of Britain, investors gradually lost 
confidence in Sterling and other major currencies. Central banks converted foreign currencies 
especially dollars into gold, which further aggravated reserve base globally and imposed burden 
on residual gold standard countries. In countries giving up the gold standard, depreciating 
enhanced cost advantages of their exports.  Expansionary monetary policy injected liquidity into 
real economy and promoted economy recovery. Their account -of-payment balance attracted 
gold and foreign investments to domestic markets. For countries still insisted on the gold 
standard, it became more and more expensive to maintain convertibility. Hence, during the year 
of 1932 and 1933, 31 countries (two thirds compared to the original data in 1931) responded to 
the pressure by depreciating currencies and suspending convertibility.  Since then, the gold 
standard became a history.  
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Appendix B: Rawski’s Research Method 
Rawski claimed that China’s economy had hardly experienced prolonged depression because of 
widely used bank notes. In his analysis framework of evaluating Chinese economic performance 
in the 1930s, he utilized two different but complementary research methods.  
Table 1 Economic Fluctuation in China and the United States, 1928-36 
 
Annual Percentage Change from Previous Years) 
 
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
1.Real GNP 
        A. U.S +6.3 -13.7 -5.9 -14.6 -2.9 +8.9 +13.1 +10.4 
B. China … … … +3.2 0.0 -8.7 +8.1 +6.4 
2. Manufacturing Output 
        A. U.S +11.5 -17.2 -19.8 -23.1 +20.0 +8.3 +17.9 +19.6 
B. China 
        National … … … +9.1 +1.8 +5.4 +8.1 +15.3 
China Proper … … … +6.2 -1.0 +5.1 +7.7 +9.2 
3.Railway Activity 
        A. U.S +3.2 -14.3 -19.4 -24.4 +6.5 +7.8 +4.9 +20.3 
B. China +7.0 … … 0.0 +7.0 +31.4 +3.5 0.0 
4. Investment Volume 
        A. U.S … -32.6 -36.4 -74 +2.6 +85 +118 +30.4 
B. China 
        National +19.7 -5.0 -0.6 +2.6 +19.5 +22.9 +1.2 +8.6 
China Proper +22.4 -0.8 +11.1 +3.4 +5.2 0.0 +2.7 +14.7 
5. Money Wages 
        A. U.S +0.2 -7.1 -10.2 -18.3 -1.9 +10.0 +9.4 +8.2 
B. China … +16.8 -3.5 -0.7 +0.4 -4.2 -1.7 -2.0 
6. Urban Retail Prices 
        A. U.S 0.0 -2.6 -9.0 -10.2 -5.3 +3.4 +2.6 +1.0 
B. China … +14.0 +0.7 +0.2 -13.1 -6.6 +7.5 +5.6 
7. Urban Wholesale Prices 
        A. U.S -1.6 -9.4 -15.5 -11.2 +1.7 +13.8 +6.8 +1 
B. China +3.9 +7.8 +7.2 -11.8 -8.5 +0.6 +4.4 +15 
8. Prices Received by Farmers 
        A. U.S 0.0 -15.6 -30.4 -25.3 +7.7 +28.6 +21.1 +4.6 
B. China +15.9 +11.9 -18.0 -7.0 -23.7 +21.1 +12.8 +4.1 
9. Money Stock 
        A. U.S +0.7 -1.3 -3.0 -14.2 -9.3 +8.3 +10.9 +13.2 
B. China +11.5 +20.2 +5.9 +8.0 +10.6 +7.7 +18.2 +17.1 
10. Bank Deposits 
        A. U.S +0.2 +3.6 -5.3 -20.3 -8.5 +11.5 +10.3 +13.2 
B. China +14.4 +20.2 +5.9 +8.0 +10.6 +7.7 +18.2 +17.1 
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Source: Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth In Prewar China (California: University of California 
Press, 1989),179. 
The first one was to compare the macroeconomic data between the United States and China 
during the time period from the Great Depression to Sino-Japanese war. The data of economic 
fluctuations in China and the United States, 1928-36 were listed in the Table 1. Unlike the 
United States, which suffered a lot in the sectors of manufacturing, railway activity, investment, 
money wages and whole sale prices, Chinese economy kept a continuous growth trend expect for 
transitory down turns. Even though the indexes of the growth of Chinese Real GDP and Money 
wages were minus after 1934, they were relatively small in contrast with data of the United 
States.  For example, as Rawski stated, manufacturing output figures of national China showed a 
continuous growth trend throughout the whole time period. Although the national level included 
Manchuria, where was conquered by Japan in 1931 and owned faster development rate by 
receiving massive investments from Japanese government, the China proper  data also reflected 
robust growth trend. Except for minus decreases in 1933, the manufacturing sector of China 
continuously blossomed. In contrast with the United States, the Federal Reserve index of 
industrial production shrank by over 36 percent between 1929 and 1933. Besides, for the figures 
of unban retail prices and urban wholesale prices, the U.S economy data indicated that it was not 
until the 1932 that they finally got rid of the shadow of depression. While the year to year prices 
index of China rarely became minus even during the toughest time of the early 1930s and after 
the American Silver Purchase Act executed. Compared with the economic performance of the 
United States, Chinese deflation started later and less severe.  
Another method used to evaluate China’s real economy is based on the quantity theory of 
money, which focuses on money velocity. The theory involves four valuables- money supply (M), 
velocity (v), price level (P) and real output (T).  The measurement of velocity equals to the 
quotient of PT and M (v=PT/M). Since the data of price level (P) and real output (T) could be 
collected from archive documents like statistic yearbooks, Rawski on purpose calculated money 
supply (M) himself to verify the velocity.  
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 Figure 3: Rawski monetary stock data gathering framework 
The money supply data gathering process was illustrated in figure 3. First of all, he categorized 
China’s monetary supply system into three parts- monetary metals, bank notes and bank deposits. 
A) Monetary metals consist of Silver and Copper. Silver data gathered from official documents 
such as “China’s Foreign Trade Statistics, 1864-1949” and “Bank of China, Report of the 
General Manager to the Annual Meeting of Shareholders, March 30,1935”, etc. The figures 
illustrated in Table 2  involved net imports of silver coin and bullion into Manchuria from 
foreign countries, which to some extent extorted massive silver flight in the China proper. The 
adjusted data of silver stock in 1932, 1935 and 1936 were $29 million, -$3 million and -$22 
million respectively. He used two variants of the time series generated from two researches- 
E.Kann (Version A) and Tang (Version B). But confined to data shortage problem, Rawski had 
to neglect possible transfers of silver between monetary and nonmonetary uses. For stock of 
copper, its data contain more uncertainties because copper’s massive usage in residents’ daily 
small transactions and its regionally various mining standards. Hence, aggregate conclusions 
about China’s copper currencies do not rely critically on the accuracy of these weak estimates. 
  
Monetary Stock 
Mental Money 
Bank Notes 
Bank Deposits 
Silver 
Copper 
Domestic Banknotes: China Proper 
Domestic Banknotes: Manchuria 
Foreign Banknotes 
Chinese Bank Deposits 
Domestic Bank Deposits: Manchuria 
Foreign Bank Deposits 
Native Bank Deposits 
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Table 2: Composition of Chinese Monetary Aggregates, 1910-36 
  Composition of Chinese Monetary Aggregates, 1910-36 
 
(Percentage shares) 
Year Silver Copper Notes Deposits Total 
M1, Version A 
     1910 43.3 22.1 6.1 28.5 100 
1915 45.2 19 10.4 25.5 100 
1920 42.8 14.2 11.4 31.6 100 
1925 37.7 9.5 15.4 37.4 100 
1930 32.3 5.6 18.1 44 100 
1936 -1.1 3.8 36.9 60.4 100 
M1, Version B 
     1910 63.4 14.3 3.9 18.4 100 
1915 63.7 12.6 6.9 16.9 100 
1920 59.6 10 8 22.3 100 
1925 52.3 7.3 11.8 28.6 100 
1930 43.6 4.7 15 36.6 100 
1936 12.5 3.3 31.9 52.3 100 
M2, Version A 
     1910 38.6 19.7 5.4 36.3 100 
1915 40.7 17.1 9.4 32.8 100 
1920 37.7 12.5 10 39.8 100 
1925 33 8.3 13.5 45.2 100 
1930 27.8 4.9 15.6 51.7 100 
1936 -0.8 2.9 31.9 69.5 100 
M2, Version B 
     1910 58.7 13.2 3.7 24.4 100 
1915 59.4 11.7 6.4 22.5 100 
1920 54.4 9.2 7.3 29.1 100 
1925 47.1 6.6 10.7 35.7 100 
1930 38.5 4.1 13.3 44.1 100 
1936 9.9 2.6 25.4 62.1 100 
Source: Nan-k’ai chih shu tzu liao hui pien, 1913-1952[ Compendium of Nan-k’ai index number 
materials](Peking: China Social Sciences Press, 1988):157. 
 B) Banknotes contain three components- the note issue of domestic banks: China proper, the 
note issue of domestic banks: Manchuria and foreign banknotes. The figures of banks in China 
proper were trustworthy, but only involved data from commercial banks. “The figures omitted 
important China’s traditional banking institutions that were native banks, exchange shops and 
merchants; and modern-style financial intermediaries such as minor commercial banks and 
institutions sponsored by provincial and county governments.” as Rawski admitted.(^9)  The 
second part- banknotes from Manchuria were comprehensive because official statistics like “ The 
Manchuria Yearbook” were available. And currencies exchange rate between yin-p’iao 
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(prevailing in Manchuria) and Shang tael were also concerned. The estimated convertible ratio at 
1:1 was based on widely acceptable research method introduced in Kann’s work- “Currencies of 
China”. The last part was foreign banks. Rawski not utilized the previous data representing the 
total note issue of foreign banks but the portion calculating in China. He modified the estimate 
method used by Hsien K’o: 
Total note issue                               2/3 of the global issue of three British banks:  
of foreign banks                              Hong Kong and Shanghai, Chartered Bank,  
in China                         =               and Mercantile Bank of India 
                                              +         total note issue of three U.S. banks: International 
                                                         Banking Corp., American Oriental Banking Corp. 
              and Asia Banking Corp. 
                        +          total issue of the Yokohama Specie Bank together  
                                              with 1/3 of the total issue of the Bank of Chosen  
                                              and the Bank of Taiwan 
                                   +         total issue of the Banque de L’Indochine 
                         +         total issue of several minor institutions of Dutch,  
                                                          Belgian, or mixed sino-foreign ownership. 
He thought 2/3 of the global issue of three British banks circulated in China was too high. He 
adjusted it into 60 percent for the Hong Kong and Shangai Bank, 25 percent for the Chartered 
Bank and 10 percent for the Merchtile Bank based on research from a Japanese historian. The 
data of U.S. banks and Japanese banks were reliable, but the Banque de L’ Indochine did their 
largest portion of business in Vietnam. Hence, Rawski left out the last two components in the 
calculation. Rawski modified foreign banknotes issuing statistic method: 
Total note issue                               three British banks: 60 percent of Hong Kong and 
of foreign banks                              Shanghai, 25 percent of Chartered Bank, and 
in China                         =               percent of Mercantile Bank of India 
                                              +         total note issue of three U.S. banks: International 
                                                         Banking Corp., American Oriental Banking Corp. 
              and Asia Banking Corp. 
                        +          total issue of the Yokohama Specie Bank together  
                                              with 1/3 of the total issue of the Bank of Chosen  
                                              and the Bank of Taiwan 
Until now, the estimated circulation of foreign banknotes in China is reached. However, one 
possible double counting problem may exist in the sector of Japanese banks in foreign banks 
notes issue and banknotes in Manchuria, where the central bank also established by Japanese 
government. Rawski’s explanation of this problem was that the figures of Manchuria banknotes 
contained the institutions operating exclusively in the northeast China, regional branches of 
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Chinese intermediaries with offices elsewhere in China (like the Bank of Communication)and 
foreign-controlled institutions the operated only in Manchuria. On principle clear classification 
may reduce the double counting possibility. But due to the hard-obtained original data, it is 
inevitable to calculate certain data twice such as noted issued by Manchurian branches of the 
Banks of China and other commercial banks.  
The finial component is bank deposits. Because of lacking systematic data that separately 
recorded demand deposits and savings deposits. Rawski focused initially on broadly money 
supply (M2). Then he utilized the estimated share of current deposits to the total deposits to 
deduce M1. In this calculation process, he included native banks data instead of omitting their 
silver reserves data as discussed above. The deposits of Native banks used a deposit-capital ratio 
of 9:1 to obtain a rough approximation of the national deposit total. The other three parts of bank 
deposits, which were deposits of Chinese commercial banks-China proper, Manchuria and 
deposits from foreign banks, were compiled systemically.  Combined the deposits of all banks, 
bank notes and monetary metals, the estimates of China’s money supply (M2) can be reached. 
The statistical calibers of different variables are summed as follows: 
Table 3: The Statistical Calibers of Different Variables  
Monetary Stock NBα 
Foreign Banks   Commercial Banks 
JPsB-MCRα N-JPsBα JPsBα   CP MCRα 
Monetary Metal  
       (*Silver) ˅ ˅ ˅ 
 
˅ ˅ ˅# 
(*Copper) ˅ ˅ ˅ 
 
˅ ˅ ˅ 
        Bank Notes 
       (Domestic Banknotes: 
China Proper) 
    
˅ ˅ 
 (Domestic Banknotes: 
Manchuria) 
     
˅ ˅ 
(Foreign Banknotes) 
 
˅ ˅ 
    
        Bank Deposits  
       (Chinese Bank Deposits) 
    
˅ ˅ 
 (Domestic Bank Deposits: 
Manchuria) 
      
˅ 
(Foreign Bank Deposits) 
 
˅ ˅ 
    (Native Bank Deposits) ˅ 
      Notes: 
* The national Silver and Copper data are generated directly without considering subsections. 
#   Manchurian silver imports data are only involved in 1932, 1935 and 1936. 
α   Abbreviations: NB: Native Banks; N-JPsB: Non-Japanese Banks; CP: China Proper; MCR: Manchuria  
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Table 4 Velocity Implications of Chinese National Product Estimates (&8) 
Year 
Real 
GDP 
Price 
Index 
Nominal 
GDP Money Stock (M2)   Velocity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) 
        A B   A B 
1914/18 24.25 0.737 17.87 2.22 3.24 
 
8.05 5.52 
1931 28.57 1.213 34.66 6.14 7.16 
 
5.64 4.84 
1932 29.47 1.118 32.95 6.43 7.45 
 
5.12 4.42 
1933 29.46 1.000 29.46 6.82 7.84 
 
4.32 3.76 
1934 26.90 0.914 24.59 6.92 7.95 
 
3.55 3.09 
1935 29.09 0.946 27.52 7.57 8.59 
 
3.64 3.20 
1936 30.94 1.095 33.88 8.57 9.10 
 
3.95 3.53 
         1931-36  29.07 1.048 30.46 7.08 8.10 
 
4.30 3.76 
average                 
Sources: Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth In Prewar China (California: University of California 
Press, 1989),166. 
 
Table 5 Regional Product, Money Supply and Velocity in Manchuria, 1934-41 (&9) 
Year Real GDP Price Index Nominal  Money Stock Velocity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1934 2.677 1.000 2.677 0.677 3.95 
1936 3.289 1.146 3.768 0.967 3.90 
1939 4.175 1.958 8.175 2.161 3.78 
1941 4.733 2.680 12.684 3.529 3.59 
Sources: Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth In Prewar China (California: University of California 
Press, 1989),166. 
 
After gating all the date, Rawski obtained the money velocity rate of the whole nation and 
Manchuria separately. The final tables are illustrated above, and based on the tables we could 
draw the curve of national velocity and Manchuria velocity as follows. 
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Figure 4 Velocity Implications of Chinese National & Manchuria Product Estimates (&8,&9) 
Sources: Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth In Prewar China (California: University of California 
Press, 1989),394-400 
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Appendix C: Chinese Monetary Reform, 1935 
The general timeline of critical events in the process of Chinese monetary reform are illustrated 
as follows, together with brief description of different roles the United States and the United 
Kingdom played.  
• 1933.3.1 
The Chinese central government officially abandoned Silcer taels and utilized Silver 
dollar as legal tender. This silver-based currency reform could not solve the Silver Crisis 
fundamentally.  
• 1933.12 
The U.S. silver purchase act was first authorized and caused the silver price more than 
doubled in the next two years, which seriously influenced Chinese monetary and banking 
system. 
• 1934.6.19 
The Chinese central government started to impose tax on silver exports. This method did 
not slow down the substantial outflow of silver from China. 
• 1934.8.20 
K'ung Hsiang-hsi (the Minister of Finance of the Republic of China) sent a telegram to 
Present Roosevelt and announced Chinese representative had signed the London 
Agreement which aimed to maintain the stabilization of global silver price. But due to the 
U.S. silver purchase act (1934), Chinese national interest had been seriously threatened 
and the outflows of silver had caused damage to the currency system. For the common 
sake of maintain the stabilization of currency, Chinese government wanted to be 
informed of the US future silver purchase plan 42 
• 1934.9.24 
K'ung Hsiang-hsi sent another telegram to the federal government. In this telegram, he 
emphasized the importance of silver to China, urged the federal government to stop 
overseas silver purchasing and maintained the silver price at the current level. Besides, 
China was considering adhering to the gold standard instead of the silver standard. To 
meet this target, the Chinese government wanted to exchange silver for gold from the 
United States. 43  This is the first time the Nanjing government informed the federal 
government that China planned to carry out currency reform and sought for help from the 
United States. However, C.Hull (Secretary of State) rejected Chinese requirement 
without critique of undertaking gold standard of China in the late October, 1934. 
• 1934.10.12 
In a public telegram sent to Sao-ke Sze (the Chinese ambassador to the United States), 
Hull noted that the United States would continue to purchase silver from abroad and 
promised to considering the interest of China when deciding the silver purchasing place, 
42 Foreign Relations of the United States 3(1934) : 440-441. 
43 lbid. 445.  
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time and volume. Each country owned the right to buy silver or gold in the global market; 
hence, the federal government would not consider the inter-governmental currency 
exchange.44 
• 1934.12.1 
K'ung Hsiang-hsi sent a telegram to the State financial consultant A.N.Young and 
advised the federal government maintain the global silver price at the level of 45 cents, 
which might contribute to Chinese currency reform. 45 
• 1934.12.12 
Cadogan (Ambassador from the United Kingdom to the Republic of China) reported to 
J.Simon (Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) that large quantities 
of silver had been shipped overseas. There was no double that smuggling to Hong Kong 
was being carried out on a large scale and native bank interest rates here recently rose as 
high as 14.6 per cent per autumn. There was a general shortage of silver in circulation 
and contraction of credit. These would lead to serious economic crisis and political 
outcome. If efficient measures did not conduct in time, the British interest in China would 
be impacted. If economic assistance was not forthcoming from British banks it might be 
offered by American interests.46 
• 1935.1.2 
Cadogan conveyed the loans requirement (2 million Pounds) from China to the United 
Kingdom China Silver Committee, which felt enable to recommend the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer to consent to the flotation of the proposed loan because it did not fall under 
either of the two classes for which consideration was promised, namely, a) sterling issued 
by a country within the sterling bloc, and b) issued of which the proceeds were calculated 
mainly to product direct benefit to British industry. They felt unable to regard the 
proposal put forward as like to afford any real or lasting remedy to China’s monetary 
difficulties47. 
• 1935.2.5 
K'ung Hsiang-his wanted to receive loans from the United States and pegged Chinese 
currency to American dollars. More specifically, Chinese monetary system would give up 
the silver standard and use American dollars as exchange standard system. The Nanjing 
government planned to sell 20 million ounce silver to the Unite States within one year 
and the federal government need to lend Chinese government at least 10 million dollars 
in together with standby credit in the same value. 48At the end of February, the U.S. 
Treasury rejected Chinese loan requirement and refused to help Chinese government 
curry out the currency reform.  
  
44 lbid. 449-450. 
45 lbid. 457-458. 
46 Documents on British Foreign Policy 20, no.2 (1919-1939):. 367,369. 
47 lbid. 339 
48 Documents on British Foreign Policy 20, no.2 (1919-1939):.535-537. 
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• 1935.2.19 
Cadogan noted to the Chinese government whether they planned to peg new legal tender 
to British sterling. Soong Tzu-wen responded to Cadogan that Chinese government 
would give up the silver system and the only way out was to peg new currency to certain 
foreign exchange, which might by British sterling. In order to promote the development 
of Chinese trade, it was necessary maintained the Chinese foreign exchange rate at the 
relative low level. Hence, the British government should offer the Chinese government 
loans (20- 25 million pounds) and credits in the same value.49 
• 1935.9 
Frederick Leith Ross (the chief economic adviser to the British government) arrived 
China in the late September. The main goal of his trip was to help the Nanjing 
government get rid of the current financial difficulties and monetary problem. However, 
the premise of British assistance was the Chinese government should officially admit the 
legalization of Manchuria, which could not be accepted by both the Chinese central 
government and Japanese government. Without the help of other countries (like Japan, 
the United States or France), the British government would not take the risk of granting 
Chinese government loans by themselves, which finally resulted in the failure of pegging 
Fabi ( new legal tender) to British Sterling. 
• 1935.10.28 
K'ung Hsiang-his noted to H.Morgenthau (Secretary of the US Treasury) that the Chinese 
government wanted the federal government brought 100 million ounce silver from China. 
Chinese government was going to conduct the currency reform which required foreign 
currency reserves to stabilize foreign exchange rate. In order to get plenty of foreign 
currency reserves, the Chinese government had to sell silver reserves in a large amount to 
the United States or in the global silver market. 
• 1935.11.4 
Without the official feedback of offering loans from the Britain and the United States, the 
Chinese central government conducted the currency reform. This wider-ranging reform 
aimed at nationalization of silver, centralization of issuing legal tender notes and control 
of foreign exchange system. Meanwhile, Chinese government first announced the foreign 
exchange rate between Fabi and Sterling (1:1.25) and the British government officially 
ordered British banks in China could not redeem note with silver. 
• 1935.11.6 
The federal government became angry at the Chinese government conducting the 
currency reform without informing them first. Morgenthau claimed that the premium for 
their currency loan was to announce Chinese Fabi pegged with American dollar. After 
the Chinese ambassador promised him that Chinese new legal tender would not peg to 
any foreign currency (especially British Sterling), the federal government agreed to 
purchase 50 million ounce silver from China. However, all the American dollars should 
49 Documents on British Foreign Policy 20, no.2 (1919-1939): 462. 
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be reserved in the American Bank located in New York and the federal government 
owned the right to supervise its usage. The federal government also changed their 
channel of silver purchasing from the London silver market to silver producing countries 
directly, which caused dramatic decrease in silver price in the London market. This 
action marked the federal government not only warned the Chinese government not to 
peg its currency to British Sterling but also challenged the financial center status of 
Britain. 
• 1935.12.21 
The British Foreign Office and the Ministry of Finance officially suspended their loans to 
China because of tensions from Japan accelerating aggregation toward the North China. 
The Chinese government gave up the plan to get loans from Britain and became member 
of the sterling bloc. 
• 1936.6 
The federal government took the advantage of situation that the United States was the 
only buyer of Chinese silver. It promised Chinese government to further offer 20 million 
dollars loan which should be mortgaged by 50 million ounce silver.  
• 1936.7 
When Leith Ross went back to London, he reported to the parliament that in the Chinese 
Government Notice (November 4th 1935) they did not announce to peg Fabi to any 
foreign currency. The Chinese government planned to peg Fabi to British Sterling but 
they did not receive any British loans. In this situation, the Chinese central government 
had to sell silver in exchange for foreign currency reserves. Because the United States 
acted as the only buyer, they controlled the Chinese government and influenced its 
process of currency reform. 
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Appendix D: Illustrations  
1. The percentage of indirectly included goods’ value to the gross trade value- Imports 
Year 
VDII GIV 
% Year 
VDII GIV 
% (HT MM) (HT MM) (HT  MM) (HT  MM) 
1867 68 69 98.6 1898 176 210 83.8 
1868 70 71 98.6 1899 222 265 83.8 
1869 71 75 94.7 1900 173 211 82.0 
1870 68 71 95.8 1901 215 268 80.2 
1871 75 78 96.2 1902 262 315 83.2 
1872 71 75 94.7 1903 278 327 85.0 
1873 70 74 94.6 1904 293 344 85.2 
1874 68 71 95.8 1905 369 447 82.6 
1875 64 68 94.1 1906 332 410 81.0 
1876 66 70 94.3 1907 383 416 92.1 
1877 68 73 93.2 1908 318 395 80.5 
1878 65 71 91.5 1909 330 418 78.9 
1879 74 82 90.2 1910 363 463 78.4 
1880 70 79 88.6 1911 390 472 82.6 
1881 80 92 87.0 1912 379 473 80.1 
1882 67 78 85.9 1913 461 570 80.9 
1883 64 74 86.5 1914 471 569 82.8 
1884 63 73 86.3 1915 387 454 85.2 
1885 74 88 84.1 1916 419 516 81.2 
1886 72 87 82.8 1917 457 550 83.1 
1887 65 192 33.9 1918 444 555 80.0 
1888 82 125 65.6 1919 499 647 77.1 
1889 70 111 63.1 1920 602 762 79.0 
1890 86 127 67.7 1921 666 906 73.5 
1891 91 134 67.9 1922 675 945 71.4 
1892 92 135 68.1 1923 735 923 79.6 
1893 96 151 63.6 1924 809 1018 79.5 
1894 139 162 85.8 1925 765 948 80.7 
1895 141 172 82.0 1926 899 1124 80.0 
1896 174 203 85.7 1927 793 1013 78.3 
1897 170 203 83.7 
    Source: Nan-k’ai chih shu tzu liao hui pien, 1913-1952[ Compendium of Nan-k’ai index number 
materials]( Peking: China Social Sciences Press, 1988):555. 
Notes: VDII : Value of Directly Included Imports 
            GIV: Gross Imports Value 
            HT: Haikwan Tael 
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The percentage of indirectly included goods’ value to the gross trade value- Exports 
Year 
VDIE GEV 
% Year 
VDIE GEV 
% (HT MM) (HT MM) (HT MM) (HT MM) 
1867 55 58 94.8 1898 135 159 84.9 
1868 68 69 98.6 1899 168 196 85.7 
1869 65 67 97.0 1900 131 159 82.4 
1870 59 62 95.2 1901 133 166 106.6 
1871 73 75 97.3 1902 177 214 81.3 
1872 82 84 97.6 1903 174 214 97.2 
1873 76 78 97.4 1904 208 239 81.2 
1874 72 74 97.3 1905 194 228 94.3 
1875 67 69 97.1 1906 215 236 102.5 
1876 78 81 96.3 1907 242 264 95.5 
1877 64 67 95.5 1908 252 277 112.3 
1878 64 67 95.5 1909 311 339 101.5 
1879 69 72 95.8 1910 344 381 90.8 
1880 75 78 96.2 1911 346 377 89.4 
1881 69 71 97.2 1912 337 371 101.9 
1882 62 67 92.5 1913 378 403 82.9 
1883 65 70 85.7 1914 334 356 111.5 
1884 62 67 106.0 1915 397 419 105.3 
1885 60 65 120.0 1916 441 482 89.0 
1886 71 77 103.9 1917 429 463 96.3 
1887 78 86 98.8 1918 446 486 121.4 
1888 80 92 81.5 1919 590 631 74.0 
1889 85 97 90.7 1920 467 542 100.4 
1890 75 87 101.1 1921 544 601 99.0 
1891 88 101 97.0 1922 595 655 105.3 
1892 88 103 106.8 1923 690 753 93.2 
1893 98 117 105.1 1924 702 772 91.7 
1894 110 128 84.4 1925 708 776 103.2 
1895 123 143 97.2 1926 801 864 97.8 
1896 108 131 82.4 1927 845 919 91.9 
1897 139 164 84.8   
   Source: Nan-k’ai chih shu tzu liao hui pien, 1913-1952[ Compendium of Nan-k’ai index number 
materials]( Peking: China Social Sciences Press, 1988):554. 
Notes: VDIE : Value of Directly Included Exports 
            GGV: Gross Exports Value 
            HT: Haikwan Tael 
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2.  New York Silver Price, 1867-1936 
Year NYSP UNYSP Year NYSP UNYSP Year NYSP 
1867 1.2484 100 1891 0.9313 74.6 1915 0.5106 
1868 1.2484 100 1892 0.8240 66 1916 0.6715 
1869 1.2484 100 1893 0.7353 58.9 1917 0.8400 
1870 1.2484 100 1894 0.6017 48.2 1918 0.9845 
1871 1.2484 100 1895 0.6242 50 1919 1.1209 
1872 1.2422 99.5 1896 0.6417 51.4 1920 1.0194 
1873 1.2072 96.7 1897 0.5718 45.8 1921 0.6310 
1874 1.1972 95.9 1898 0.5555 44.5 1922 0.6793 
1875 1.1660 93.4 1899 0.5693 45.6 1923 0.6524 
1876 1.0824 86.7 1900 0.5843 46.8 1924 0.6711 
1877 1.1236 90 1901 0.5618 45 1925 0.6941 
1878 1.0861 87 1902 0.4969 39.8 1926 0.6243 
1879 1.0549 84.5 1903 0.5106 40.9 1927 0.5668 
1880 1.0724 85.9 1904 0.5443 43.6 1928 0.5849 
1881 1.0611 85 1905 0.5743 46 1929 0.5331 
1882 1.0711 85.8 1906 0.6342 50.8 1930 0.3846 
1883 1.0224 81.9 1907 0.6217 49.8 1931 0.2901 
1884 1.0462 83.8 1908 0.6342 50.8 1932 0.2749 
1885 1.0012 80.2 1909 0.6217 49.8 1933 0.3501 
1886 0.9401 75.3 1910 0.5031 40.3 1934 0.4817 
1887 0.9213 73.8 1911 0.6342 50.8 1935 0.6432 
1888 0.8876 71.1 1912 0.6217 49.8 1936 0.451 
1889 0.8814 70.6 1913 0.6124 40.3 
  1890 0.9912 79.4 1914 0.5633 39.3     
Souces: NYSP- Source: Nan-k’ai chih shu tzu liao hui pien, 1913-1952[ Compendium of Nan-k’ai index 
number materials]( Peking: China Social Sciences Press, 1988):485; NYSP- Source: Nan-k’ai chih shu 
tzu liao hui pien, 1913-1952[ Compendium of Nan-k’ai index number materials]( Peking: China Social 
Sciences Press, 1988):636-637. 
 
Notes: 1.NYSP: New York Silver Price;  UNYSP: Unadjusted New York Silver Price 
           2. NYSP is from 1915 to 1936, which is recorded in cents. UNYSP is from 1867 to 1915, which is 
silver price index. The conversion formula: 
𝑁𝑌𝑆𝑃1867−1914 = 𝑈𝑁𝑌𝑆𝑃1867−1914 × 𝑁𝑌𝑆𝑃1915𝑈𝑁𝑆𝑃1915 = 𝑈𝑁𝑌𝑆𝑃1867−1814 × 0.510640.9 = 0.0124 
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       3.   Value of China's Imports and Export, Classify by Ports, 1926-1935 
Year 
Shanghai   Tientsin   Canton   Hankow 
Imports Exports   Imports Exports   Imports Exports   Imports Exports 
1926 929433 563849 
 
131533 94437 
 
104659 70467 
 
84629 36839 
1927 709384 514928 
 
157190 138520 
 
67734 109030 
 
29494 18676 
1928 854731 564339 
 
175484 127750 
 
62452 114259 
 
78536 43244 
1929 973198 567176 
 
177720 128278 
 
65059 117001 
 
53915 43636 
1930 1059038 487137 
 
162320 122691 
 
79709 94052 
 
41508 29058 
1931 1298699 364588 
 
170370 138196 
 
87578 96302 
 
47854 42251 
1932 795161 246669 
 
162887 97962 
 
84373 53151 
 
38558 31637 
1933 736220 315758 
 
120778 88472 
 
62009 58404 
 
34259 7649 
1934 600483 272305 
 
96670 81051 
 
33848 47128 
 
32214 9848 
1935 507695 288874   85160 91202   33761 39936   33216 12599 
Source: Nan-k’ai chih shu tzu liao hui pien, 1913-1952[ Compendium of Nan-k’ai index number 
materials]( Peking: China Social Sciences Press, 1988):88. 
 
 
      4.    Net Silver Exports from China, 1934-1935 
Year 
Shanghai National 
Year 
Shanghai  National 
(Thousand Ch$) (Thousand Ch$) (Thousand Ch$) (Thousand Ch$) 
1934Jan. -1789 -1783 1935Jan. 3895 -2709 
Feb. -1696 1566 Feb. 1046 -550 
Mar. 12385 -867 Mar. -1434 -986 
Apr. -11454 14763 Apr. -6042 -2429 
May -2178 2147 May 1737 1043 
Jun. 8875 12936 Jun. 2378 -48 
Jul. 19058 24308 Jul. 4200 -98 
Aug. 65845 79094 Aug. -800 -229 
Sep. 42168 48139 Sep. 890 -736 
Oct. 37378 56332 Oct. 1700 -55 
Nov. 36356 11327 Nov. 400 -110 
Dec. 27518 11974 Dec. 35371 66542 
Source: Data from Nan-k’ai chih shu tzu liao hui pien, 1913-1952[ Compendium of Nan-k’ai index 
number materials] (Peking: China Social Sciences Press, 1988), 485-6; Pang H.K. Chang,” Commodity 
Price Shocks and International Finance”( Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
1983),109. 
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5.   Shanghai Native Banks, 1912-1916 
Year Number of Units Capital ( Thousand Yuan) Volume of Clearing 
  New Failed Total Total Per Unit ( Thousand yuan) 
1912 4 27 28 1488 53 … 
1913 3 0 31 1684 54 … 
1914 9 0 40 2049 51 … 
1915 2 0 42 2161 51 … 
1916 10 3 49 2829 58 … 
1917 0 0 49 2829 58 … 
1918 19 6 62 4390 71 … 
1919 7 2 67 5295 79 … 
1920 4 0 71 7768 109 … 
1921 4 6 69 8431 122 … 
1922 10 5 74 10797 146 … 
1923 15 5 84 14502 173 … 
1924 7 2 89 16625 187 6459* 
1925 5 11 83 16659 201 11255 
1926 6 2 87 18757 216 15274 
1927 2 4 85 19007 224 12365 
1928 0 5 80 17989 225 14776 
1929 1 3 78 18527 238 16858 
1930 3 4 77 19738 256 21457 
1931 4 5 76 20245 266 26982 
1932 1 5 72 21385 297 18018 
1933 3 7 68 21798 321 13990 
1934 2 5 65 20702 318 14561^ 
1935 0 10 55 19382 352 13581 
1936 0 7 48 18000 375 16482 
Sources: Data from Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth In Prewar China (California: University of 
California Press, 1989),141. 
Notes : * Figure is for April-December only  
               ^ Modern bankers' clearing house opened in this year 
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  6:  Number of Chinese Commercial Banks Offices, 1936 
 
Source: Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth In Prewar China (California: University of California 
Press, 1989),136. 
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7:  Location Distribution of Chinese Commercial Banks, 1936
 
Source: Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth In Prewar China (California: University of California 
Press, 1989),136. 
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